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ABSTRACT 
Nowhere has the mid-20th century polarization of Northeast Asia been 
more evident than on the Korean Peninsula.  Over the past six decades, efforts 
toward Korean unification have spanned the range of total warfare, covert 
attacks, propagandist affronts, and formal diplomacy to no avail.  Amidst the talk 
of unification however, it seems a better understanding about the evolving nature 
of Korea’s division is needed.  Using a truly unique International Relations 
approach, this thesis explores the utility of Alexander Wendt’s Social Theory of 
International Politics to address the evolving structure of Northeast Asia and its 
implications for Korean unification.  The results of this analysis contrast with 
those of predominant IR theories such as Neorealism and suggest that 
unification is becoming less likely under current structural trends.  Additionally, 
the constructivist methodology employed here shows that while the United States 
will continue to play an important role in regional security, it must begin to diverge 
from its anachronistic Cold War defense posture to ensure future stability.  By 
providing a deeper understanding about the macro-level structure of Northeast 
Asia, this thesis will contribute to the development of policies which will both 
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A. IMPORTANCE  
Northeast Asia has emerged as one of the primary power centers in the 
modern international system.  Its salience is anchored economically by the 
affluence of Japan, the newly industrialized economies of South Korea and 
Taiwan, and most recently through the market-oriented People’s Republic of 
China (PRC).  Corresponding with its impressive economic stature, the region 
also hosts an aggregate military force of nearly 5 million troops and is a nexus of 
nuclear weaponry.  Geographically, it interlocks two proven nuclear states (the 
PRC and Russia), one developing nuclear state (North Korea), and arguably 
three other members with the potential for rapid nuclear weapons acquisition 
(Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan).1  While some Asian scholars now consider 
the region to be “ripe for rivalry,”2 others have stated that, “at no time has the 
challenge of redefining national identities seemed more urgent and open-ended 
than in recent post-Cold War years, particularly in the Northeast Asian region.”3 
Also embedded in Northeast Asia is the United States—itself an advanced 
nuclear state, the possessor of an overwhelming conventional military force, and 
historically the most integrated external economic actor in the region.  While 
Northeast Asia as a whole experienced periodic conflict from 1894-1953, it has 
remained relatively stable since then, either due to or coincidental with America’s 
robust presence.  American bilateral defense alliances with Japan, South Korea, 
and Taiwan emerged early in the 1950s to buttress efforts at containing the 
spread of communism, subsequently entrenching a polarized security paradigm 
which still persists today. 
Nowhere has the mid-20th century polarization of Northeast Asia been 
more evident than on the Korean Peninsula.  Six decades have passed since the 
                                            
1 Samuel S. Kim, ed., The International Relations of Northeast Asia (New York: Routledge 
Curzon, 2004), 5-9. 
2 Aaron Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia,” International 
Security 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993-1994): 5-33. 
3 Kim, 42. 
2 
United States and the Soviet Union arbitrarily divided responsibilities for 
disarming Japan’s colonial regime in Korea along the 38th parallel.  The 
emergent, antagonistic halves became not only bitter civil war enemies with 
distinct ideas about how to govern their newly-decolonized society, but they also 
became sentries for their respective superpower patrons in a global battle 
between “good” and “evil.”  The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 was a symbolic end 
to this global battle.  It contributed not only to the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
but it also sparked the reunification process between East and West Germany.  
However, whether that shocking event ended all aspects of the Cold War is 
debatable as one looks out across Korea’s four kilometer-wide demilitarized 
zone—the peninsular problem remains unresolved. 
Efforts toward the unification of Korea have spanned the range of total 
warfare, covert attacks, propagandist affronts, and formal diplomacy to no avail.4  
Yet despite these failures, Korean unification remains a desirable goal and 
plausible to many.  Talk in the Western world about Korean unification rarely 
proceeds beyond key contemporary issues though—North Korean ballistic 
missile proliferation and nuclear weapons development, the U.S. military 
presence in South Korea, the 1953 armistice agreement, or the Kim Jong-il cult 
of personality.  These issues are indeed significant to the process of Korean 
unification, but awareness of them has done little toward bringing the two Koreas 
closer.  As such, unification continues to elude the Korean people—and Korea’s 
division continues to fuel anachronistic fires in the region, ultimately threatening 
the tenuous stability which has pervaded for so long. 
After years of fruitless efforts to unify the Korean Peninsula (an expressed 
intent of both the North and South to varying degrees, along with a stated desire 
of the U.S. State Department), it seems what is needed is a better understanding 
                                            
4 The “unification” of Korea will be referred to throughout this discussion instead of 
“reunification,” as the effect on the overall argument is considered nil.  Whether Korea will be 
unified or reunified is semantically debatable, although the term reunification is perhaps more 
sensitive toward the modern Korean perspective.  The Choson dynasty encompassed the 
territory of both Koreas from 1392-1910, but full sovereignty and the Western recognition of Asian 
nations was hardly established during that timeframe.  Additionally, there has never been a single 
Korean seat in the United Nations; there have been two since 1991 when both North and South 
Korea were admitted. 
3 
about the evolving nature of Korea’s division and how the region of Northeast 
Asia affects it.  That is, what factors are currently working to keep the two Koreas 
apart?  Are the two Koreas complicit in their own sustained division?  Or, has the 
surrounding political environment of Northeast Asia been the primary constraint 
on Korean unification?  Additionally, is that environment becoming more or less 
conducive to Korean unification over time?  Furthermore, what impact does U.S. 
foreign policy have on this political environment?  Do current American policies 
promote regional stability while inhibiting the prospects of Korean unification or 
vice versa?  Do they do both or neither simultaneously? 
Utilizing a systemic International Relations (IR) approach based on social 
constructivist theory, this discussion offers a new perspective on the problems 
confronting Korean unification and suggests that unification is becoming less 
likely over time as a consequence of evolving structural conditions in Northeast 
Asia.  This does not mean that Korean unification has become impossible, but 
that the prospects for it are diminishing under current trends.  Furthermore, it will 
be suggested that the United States remains a critical actor in the Northeast 
Asian security picture, although there is mounting pressure to alter its 
anachronistic policy approach to the region.  Existing U.S. policies neither meet 
the needs of future regional stability nor the unification of North and South Korea.   
In 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell and Germany was reunified, the world 
and all of its Cold War analysts were caught by surprise.  Fortunately, these 
events favored much of the European continent and the regional system that 
America helped to build.  A continued misunderstanding about the division of the 
two Koreas, however, could produce consequences which are much less 
desirable for the United States in Northeast Asia today. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
If the unification of Korea is truly considered a salient factor in the 
sustained peace of Northeast Asia, it is imperative to begin analyzing its two 
halves with an IR approach that is both cogent in the present and sustainable in 
the future.  One of these approaches utilizes the perspective of international 
relations that there are inescapable forces at play between states that affect their 
4 
behavior among one another.  Proponents of this systemic approach have further 
become enmeshed in an ontological debate about which specific forces drive 
state behavior in the international system.  One side of this structural debate 
originates from a materialist and individualist perception of the world whereby 
states pursue their self-interests amongst one another within a system of 
anarchy, which is ungoverned by an ultimate arbitrator or Leviathan.5  States in 
this type of system are considered rational actors because they have clearly 
defined interests that they pursue, while weighing the costs and benefits of their 
actions vis-à-vis others.  Additionally, these rational states desire their own 
continued survival.   
Neorealists such as Kenneth Waltz posit that in the absence of a 
legitimate arbitrator or international government, each state takes on a 
functionally similar role to all other states in the system—each contains some 
form of government that presides over a given citizenry and occupies a given 
territory—but each state varies in its respective distribution of power (resources, 
population, etc.) compared to other states.  Therefore, the outcomes of systemic 
competition, according to Waltz, reflect each individual state’s natural and 
acquired capabilities to stay alive.6  Accordingly, this self-help hypothesis  
 
                                            
5 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth, 
Ecclesiastical and Civil [1651], ed.  Michael Oakeshott (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960), is one of 
the classic texts used in the study of international relations.  Hobbes makes several statements 
regarding the state of nature as he sees it, proclaiming that “…during the time men live without a 
common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a 
war, as is of every man, against every man.”  The common power he refers to is the “Leviathan” 
or commonwealth, which men abdicate their rights of self government to. 
6 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979) is an 
excellent, but highly criticized attempt to theorize the interaction of states at a systemic level.  Its 
criticism is levied by various pedigrees of political and social scientists, yet it remains critical to 
modern studies of international relations.  This author’s primary disagreements with Waltz’s 
theory are that (1) it assumes too much similarity about individual states (intentional by Waltz) 
and (2) it was framed during a period of history when the world appeared to operate on Realist 
terms (see also Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International 
Relations Theory,” in Neorealism and its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia, 
1986), 211-214.  It remains inadequate to predict systemic changes such as the end of the Cold 
War where the Soviet Union’s material power changed dramatically as a result of domestic 
politics, altering system polarity rapidly.  The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98 could also be 
viewed as a rapid change in relative power among Asian nations, yet system polarity was largely 
unaffected and widespread attempts to balance or rebalance the system were not undertaken. 
5 
replicates the outcomes from the microeconomic model (states are like “firms” in 
the international system or “market”) Waltz uses to describe the international 
system as a whole. 
While Neorealism is capable of describing the behavior between states 
such as North and South Korea throughout the Cold War period, its assumptions 
about states cause distinct problems in assessing Korea’s future.  First, it 
assumes the de facto existence of states within the international system while 
taking their interests (security and power) as given.  Neorealism does not 
account for the creation of new states, such as the new republics which emerged 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, even though it hints at the possibility of 
state elimination.7  The best we can infer about state creation from Neorealism is 
that “each state duplicates the activities of other states” because “the ends they 
aspire to are similar.”8   
From this, Neorealism suggests that the Ukraine, Belarus, and 
Kazakhstan should have all had interests resembling Russia’s after 1991.  
However, this was proven otherwise in one of many instances when the three 
former republics gave up their nuclear weapons capabilities and the latter 
maintained them.9  Giving away this “acquired” nuclear security counters the 
fundamental tenets of Neorealism, and in the time since the Ukraine, Belarus, 
and Kazakhstan gained their respective independence from the Soviet Union, 
their existence as nations has not been externally threatened. 
Second, Neorealists claim that the most powerful states in the 
international system “set the scene” for all others and propagate power-balancing 
competitions which result in structural arrangements with various degrees of 
polarity.10  While this is perhaps a quintessential aspect behind the division and 
sustained separation of Korea throughout the Cold War, it nevertheless suggests 
starkly conflicting consequences should Korea become unified.  On one hand, 
                                            
7 Waltz, 95. 
8 Ibid., 96. 
9 Federation of American Scientists.  http://www.fas.org (accessed 22 May 06). 
10 Waltz, 94. 
6 
the balance of the current international system may be altered little by a newly-
unified Korean “shrimp” subject to competing “whales” (kyeongjeon hasa) such 
as China, Japan, Russia, or the United States.  On the other hand, a unified 
Korea could immediately lead to an imbalance in the modern international 
system due to its relative and absolute increases in material power (territory, 
resources, population, etc.).  While either of these could prove to be true over 
time, the potential disparity between the opposing structural consequences is far 
too great to ignore and Neorealism does little to predict which of these 
circumstances is more probable.   
Third, the causality of a material-driven international structure on individual 
state behavior suggests that a unified Korea, in a dog-eat-dog (ijeon tugu) world, 
would be destined to compete with its already polarized neighbors since it would 
immediately represent a more capable actor than it did while divided.  
Conversely, Korea’s neighbors may attempt to prevent the unification process in 
the first place for the sake of conserving their own relative power in the region.11  
In Thucydidean terms, Korea would then be compelled to balance against the 
“systemic tyrants” who aim to suppress it, seeking alignment with states outside 
of the region for protection.  It is certainly conceivable that the PRC, Russia, and 
Japan may have concerns about a new power emerging in Northeast Asia, but 
Neorealism offers little insight toward the possibilities of cooperation with Korea 
under these circumstances.  Once again, Germany’s reunification did not lead to 
direct conflicts with its neighbors or collusion against it.  Neorealism therefore, 
provides only a pessimistic view of the potential unification of Korea and leads to 
worst-case policy scenarios for the United States. 
Critics of Neorealism, however, present an expanded pallet of variables in 
their analyses of systemic structure, promoting the salience of both sub-unit 
(domestic) and supra-unit (international) processes in the alteration of state 
                                            
11 Waltz, 70. 
7 
behaviors over time.12  Barry Buzan, Charles Jones and Richard Little distinguish 
Structural Realism from Waltz’s Neorealism by eliminating the microeconomic 
foundation, disaggregating the all-encompassing concept of relative state power 
into distinct state capabilities, and by acknowledging that “[t]here is not one logic 
of anarchy, but many.”13  Admittedly, this is an attempt by Buzan, Jones, and 
Little to make an “archipelago” out of the various “islands” of international 
relations theory.  However, providing additional pieces to the puzzle of 
international relations, even in a more orderly fashion, does not necessarily 
improve Structural Realism’s theoretical potential.  It lacks the coherence and 
simplistic appeal of Neorealism, which is a much more defined land mass in 
systemic terms.14  But Structural Realism also does little to show that material 
egoism is not a given condition of states in an anarchical system, even if the 
potential “logics” of anarchy which they describe are many. 
From the Liberal Institutionalist (Neoliberal) perspective, establishing rules 
and norms for state behavior at the international level can regulate cooperation 
among otherwise self-regarding states under anarchic conditions, thereby 
diminishing the inevitability of conflict connoted by Neorealism.15  Understanding 
the impacts that international regimes have on transmitting rules and norms 
provides a much better avenue of exploration for the future of  a unified Korea; 
such rules and norms can be considered systemic constraints or expectations 
which all states should live up to.   
                                            
12 For prominent critiques of Waltz’s Theory of International Politics, Barry Buzan, Charles 
Jones and Richard Little offer a Structural Realist view in The Logic of Anarchy (New York: 
Columbia, 1993); a Liberal Institutionalist perspective is presented in Robert Keohane, ed. 
Neorealism and its Critics; and John Gerard Ruggie critiques and compares Neorealism and 
Neoliberalism contra Social Constructivism in Constructing the World Polity: Essays on 
International Institutionalism (New York: Routledge, 2003). 
13 Buzan, Jones and Little, 244. 
14 Ibid. See especially Chapter 2 and Chapter 13. 
15 Pertinent examples on the tenets of Neoliberalism are Robert Axelrod and Robert O. 
Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” World Politics 38, 
No. 1 (October 1985): 226-254; Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, “The 
Rational Design of International Institutions,” International Organization 55, No. 4 (Autumn 2001): 
761-799; and Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,” 
International Security 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995): 39-51. 
8 
Due to the convergence of two vastly different political systems, world 
views, and the historical North-South dependence on opposing larger powers, a 
nascent, unitary Korea may well be compelled to cooperate with its neighbors 
over mutual interests because of the separation and suffering it has endured (so 
as to avoid it again).  Furthermore, Neoliberals such as Robert Keohane posit 
that international cooperation is most feasible among those nations with 
advanced market economies and similar political systems which become 
increasingly interdependent on each other.16  Presumably, South Korea’s current 
economic ties among its Asian neighbors and the rest of the world, along with its 
maturing democracy would benefit a unified Korea, bolstering the Neoliberal 
approach (it will not be suggested here that Korean unification would occur under 
the socialist/isolationist banner of North Korea). 
Unfortunately, the promise of a Neoliberal approach is susceptible to the 
same pitfalls of Neorealism; it accepts the preexistence of states within the 
international system, it maintains a limited concept of international anarchy,17 
and uses “power” and “wealth” to determine the relative order of states among 
each other—all drawbacks from pursuing the structural implications on a 
potentially unified Korean state.18  Thus, while the Neorealist-Neoliberal debate 
varies through its level of analysis,19 it ultimately revolves around the material 
concerns of rational-egoist states, and either side unnecessarily predisposes a 
unified Korea to a self-regarding collision course with its larger neighbors.20  
                                            
16 Robert Keohane’s After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) establishes much of the Neoliberal 
canon, and in it he questions the ability of nations to cooperate in the absence of a hegemonic 
power.  For lack of better explanations at the time it was written, Keohane accepts many of 
Waltz’s systemic assumptions about the world, including the rational-egoist nature of states.  
Ultimately with regard to Waltz though, he believes that “no systemic analysis can be complete” 
and that state behavior also rests on domestic institutions and leadership. 
17 Ibid., 7. 
18 Ibid., 21. 
19 David Singer addressed this issue long before the controversy existed between 
Neorealists and Neoliberals in “The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations,” World 
Politics (October 1961), 77-92.   
20 Keohane (1984), 27. 
9 
A fundamentally different way to study the structure of international 
relations and the future of Korea is to view state interaction sociologically instead 
of materially—based on the “distribution of ideas” rather than the distribution of 
power.21  Some constructivists argue that a system of states structured along 
differing social cultures and analyzed in terms of enmity, rivalry, and amity is 
distinctly different than one modeled on market economics where all states are 
analogized as firms trying to maximize their profits.  Such an approach, offered 
by Alexander Wendt’s Social Theory of International Politics (hereafter STIP), not 
only acknowledges state cognition of “self” vis-à-vis “others” across the range of 
state interactions, but also suggests that state behaviors may result from the 
repeated patterns of social behavior among other states.22   
Wendt’s idealist and holist approach is promising when addressing the 
complexities of the modern Northeast Asian region and also when considering 
the potential of Korean unification into a preexisting system of anarchy.  It 
enables a regional analysis under the current conditions of Korean division and 
accommodates the creation of a unified Korean identity in the future, unhindered 
by material properties alone.  Furthermore, the ontological differentiation 




                                             
21 A systemic theory of international relations derived from constructivism is presented by 
Alexander Wendt in Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), which was published after his well-known article “Anarchy is what States Make of it: 
The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992): 
391-425. A “distribution of ideas” is used by Wendt to describe various political cultures in the 
international system.  Many of his terms are used specifically throughout this discussion unless 
otherwise stated. 
22 There are different “strands” of constructivism and correspondingly different names for 
each according to various scholars.  Alexander Wendt speaks of “building a bridge” between 
“modern” and “postmodern” constructivists in “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social 
Construction of Power Politics”; John Gerard Ruggie provides descriptions of “neo-classical,” 
“post-modernist,” and “naturalistic” constructivists in “What Makes the World Hang Together: 
Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge,” International Organization 52, No. 4 
(Autumn 1998): 855-885; Ted Hopf distinguishes between “conventional” and “critical” 
constructivists in “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” International 
Security 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998): 171-200. 
10 
on the other, provides a philosophical and theoretical foundation for STIP which 
does not presuppose conflict within a system of anarchy, even though its 
possibilities are not removed.23 
Although there is an increasing body of empirical studies pertaining to 
constructivist approaches to international relations, both proponents and critics 
have cited the need for additional research to support its utility.24  Ted Hopf has 
proposed a constructivist research agenda, highlighting common IR concerns 
such as “the balance of threat, security dilemmas, neoliberal institutionalist 
accounts of cooperation under anarchy, and the liberal theory of democratic 
peace” as areas for the alternate approach of constructivism.25   
As one of the variants within this alternate approach, using STIP allows 
the issues raised by Hopf to be addressed indirectly by assessing just how 
“distributed” certain ideas are within Northeast Asia.  Pertaining to STIP 
particularly, Kathleen McNamara has criticized Wendt’s text by asserting that 
“researchers looking for a historically grounded assessment of the cultures of 
anarchy or a template for doing empirical constructivist work will have to look 
elsewhere.”26  Ultimately, this discussion is an effort to contribute to the  
 
 
                                            
23 David Dessler challenges Wendt’s “materialist” perception of Neorealism in his book 
review of Social Theory of International Politics. See American Political Science Review 94, No. 
4, (December 2000): 1002-1003. 
24 Thomas Berger addresses state identity and interests in “Power and Purpose in Pacific 
East Asia: A Constructivist Interpretation,” in International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific, 
eds. G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 
387-419, although he resorts primarily to economic factors which account for identity shifts in 
Northeast Asia after World War II, leaving room for Realist and Neoliberal arguments; J.J. Suh 
presents an exceptionally strong constructivist explanation of state identities in, “Bound to Last? 
The U.S.-Korea Alliance and Analytical Eclecticism,” in Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, 
Power, and Efficiency, eds. J.J. Suh, Peter Katzenstein, and Allen Carlson (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2004), 131-171; Yücel Bozdağlioğlu addresses foreign policy as a measure of 
national identity in Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach (New 
York: Routledge, 2003); and  Maja Zehfuss critiques the utility of constructivism in explaining 
Germany’s post-reunification identity in Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of 
Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
25 Hopf, 186. 
26 Kathleen McNamara. Book review of Social Theory of International Politics by Alexander 
Wendt, The Journal of Politics 63, No. 3 (August 2001): 997-999. 
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“elsewhere” that McNamara mentions by empirically addressing Korea’s division 
and its relationship to the modern history of Northeast Asia, utilizing the cultures 
of systemic anarchy defined by Wendt in STIP. 
The division of nations such as Korea is not an uncommon phenomenon 
since inception of the Westphalian state system in Europe in 1648.27  Civil wars, 
territorial conflicts, colonization, and outright conquest have caused or 
perpetuated various degrees of separation among otherwise unified political 
entities from Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East.  But the 
unification of states within the international system is a much less frequent 
occurrence.  The potential of Korean unification, therefore, distinctly relates it to a 
small family of cases which were salient throughout the Cold War as “fault lines” 
and have become important in the modern international system since that time.28   
As proxies (albeit with their own domestic interests), the divided polities of 
Vietnam, Germany, China, and Korea became enveloped in an ideologically-
driven competition with systemic impacts, and were utilized to varying degrees as 
pawns in a four decade-long struggle of superpower identity.29  Two of these 
cases, Vietnam and Germany, have resulted in the unification of previously 
separated political entities and the emergence of new states within different 
regions.  Since domestic politics or unit-level phenomena alone were not enough 
to facilitate either instance of unification, the study of international structure on 
state unification remains a worthy pursuit. 
                                            
27 I label previously unified political entities within a defined territory as “nations” here only to 
differentiate them from modern “states” which are largely products of the post-World War II 
period.  The definition of a state in Wendt’s STIP centers on the notion of sovereignty, which is 
constitutive of recognition by other “states” as being the legitimate authority over a defined 
territory and society, with a legal-institutional order and a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. 
28  Weiqun Gu labels China, Germany, Korea, and Vietnam as the “fault lines” of the Cold 
War in Conflicts of Divided Nations: The Cases of China and Korea (Westport: Praeger, 1995), 4. 
29 I assert from an idealist perspective, that the Cold War was a conflict between the two 
primary winners of World War II based on their desires for a capitalist versus a socialist 
international economic order.  These ideas were absolutely antithetical to each other, and as a 
result, the expansion of American and Soviet identities became necessary to guarantee their 
desired systems until much of the globe became an “us” against “them” arrangement.  Wendt 
also discusses this phenomenon on p. 375 of STIP. 
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In regard to the unification of divided states, there remains relatively little 
IR scholarship dedicated to it as a unique phenomenon in its own right.  One 
such study is Conflicts of Divided Nations (1995) by Weiqun Gu, who defines 
divided state relations as “transpolital,” representing a combination of domestic 
and international politics, and as sui generis, or one of a kind.30  This is certainly 
an appropriate perspective, not denied by this study, but Gu’s synthesized 
comparative politics-IR methodology focuses primarily on various levels of 
conflict between the PRC and Taiwan and the two Koreas throughout the Cold 
War.  It also utilizes an eclectic mix of variables which have already been shown 
ineffective in an STIP approach.   
The first three variables in Gu’s study utilize Neorealist principles and 
have proven unsatisfactory at describing divided state outcomes since the time of 
Gu’s writing.  The balance of power between “contestant” states and also 
between their “superpower backers” represent Gu’s first two variables, while the 
overall system polarity constitutes the third.31  From this Neorealist perspective, 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dramatic shift in overall power between 
North and South Korea toward the latter’s favor should have generated North 
Korean attempts to rebalance the regional system or bandwagon with another 
state throughout the early 1990s.  However, this was not the case—North Korea 
moved only further toward self-isolation—implying that there is more to the 
existing culture of anarchy in Northeast Asia than such variables can describe. 
The final two variables in Gu’s study are taken from second- and first-
image levels of analyses respectively.  While supplementing the first three third-
image variables from the inside-out, they depart from the Neorealist structural 
analysis.  Here, changes in domestic political systems and changes in leadership 
are explored, but on their own, do not fully explain Korea’s sustained division, nor 
do they contribute toward an explanation of future unification.32 
                                            
30 Gu, 5. 
31 Ibid., 14. 
32 Ibid., 14. 
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However ineffective these five key variables are in an STIP or other 
structural analysis, Gu does address two issues which are of significant interest.  
First is the notion that divided states struggle for international legitimacy,33 which 
appeals specifically to the crucial concept of state sovereignty prescribed by 
STIP.  Second, Gu directly cites a Hobbesian “state of nature” as the basic 
environment for divided states.34  While this may or may not be true (a definition 
for the Hobbesian “state of nature” in international relations is not provided by 
Gu), this description registers among the potential logics of anarchy which will be 
examined later in this discussion. 
A second effort at examining divided states as a unique phenomenon was 
made in a compilation of essays published shortly after the end of the Cold War.  
Although it places more emphasis on domestic politics in divided state conflict 
resolution, Politics of Divided Nations: China, Korea, Germany and Vietnam—
Unification, Conflict Resolution and Political Development, edited by Quansheng 
Zhao and Robert Sutter, also highlights a favorable international environment as 
“crucial” in resolving divided state relationships.35  This insight again hints at the 
importance of a structural analysis, but in this book, it is framed primarily in 
respect to the Cold War.   
While the Cold War was a watershed event in the division of China, Korea, 
Germany, and Vietnam, it has proven not to be very significant in divided state 
resolution aside from the German case (which may in itself have been 
coincidental).  From a Neorealist or Neoliberal point of view, dissolution of the 
Soviet Union may have represented a structural shift from a bipolar international 
system to a unipolar or multipolar system.  However, from an STIP perspective, 
systemic polarity describes little about systemic structure. 
                                            
33 Gu, 15-16. 
34 Gu, 4. 
35 Zhao Quansheng and Robert Sutter, eds., Politics of Divided Nations: China, Korea, 
Germany, Vietnam—Unification, Conflict Resolution and Political Development, in Occasional 
Papers/Reprint Series in Contemporary Asian Studies 5 (Baltimore: University of Maryland, 
1991), 2. 
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Within the same volume, Ahn Byung-joon analyzes the international 
situation as one of three important elements affecting resolution between the two 
Koreas specifically.36  The end of the Cold War, German unification, political 
shifts in Eastern Europe, and normalization of Soviet-South Korean relations are 
some of the key variables for Ahn’s analysis of the international situation, but in 
the fifteen years since these events transpired, their direct impacts on the two 
Koreas are questionable, if even measurable.37  Although concluding that the 
peoples and governments of the two Koreas should ultimately lead the peace 
and unification processes, Han Sung-joo emphasizes “détente between the 
United States and the Soviet Union” as “the most notable and important 
development” in international relations for the two Koreas,38 and cites China, the 
United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan as important participants in resolving 
the North-South dispute.39 
The previous assessment of literature available to aid in the understanding 
of the Korean situation at a structural level provides results of only limited benefit.  
Neorealism, Structural Realism, and Neoliberalism all offer a predisposed IR 
approach, while eclectic efforts toward divided states as sui generis phenomena 
acknowledge the importance of the international environment, yet look primarily 
to the end of the Cold War for answers—answers which still have not come.  The 
international environment in Northeast Asia is indeed a critical factor in Korea’s 
future, but it must be assessed from a different perspective before a new way 
ahead can be established.  
C. METHODOLOGY 
To provide a new perspective on the Korean situation in Northeast Asia, 
the methodology for this study will attempt to follow through on the theoretical 
basis of STIP, which is discussed in detail in Chapter 2.  Such an approach 
                                            
36 Ahn Byung-joon, “Peace, Cooperation, and Reunification in Korea” in Politics of Divided 
Nations: China, Korea, Germany, Vietnam—Unification, Conflict Resolution and Political 
Development, eds. Zhao Quansheng and Robert Sutter, 90. 
37 Ahn, 90. 
38 Han Sung-joo, “Problems and Prospects for Peace and Unification in Korea” in ibid., 109. 
39 Ibid., 106. 
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implies that patterns of social behavior between states emerge over time and can 
have normalizing effects on other states around them, regardless of material 
conditions.  Utilizing theoretical concepts from STIP, state interactions across 
Northeast Asia will be empirically analyzed in terms of Hobbesian, Lockean, and 
Kantian cultural logics.  Beginning with the post-World War II period and 
continuing through the conventional end of the Cold War, the aggregation of 
results from the state-to-state assessments will provide insight on the macro-
level of social structure in Northeast Asia.  The primary focus will be to construct 
the social history of the region by assessing the dyadic relations between each of 
the primary actors.  The results will be aggregated across specific historic 
periods according to significant social patterns of the time.  From these historic 
case studies, valuable data points (DPs) for mapping the overall trend in regional 
culture will emerge. 
Performing this structural assessment of Northeast Asia and its impacts 
on Korea’s division utilizes a synthesized approach drawn from a variety of 
literary sources.  In addition to Social Theory of International Politics as the 
theoretical foundation, primary sources such as American and Chinese foreign 
policy documents and news media reports will provide the empirical foundation.  
Secondary materials will be used extensively for this study and consist of books, 
scholarly journals, and academic publications related to the specific topics being 
addressed. 
D. REVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
Although many scholars and students of IR are familiar with the academic 
works of Alexander Wendt (especially his concept that “anarchy is what states 
make of it”), the in-depth study of Social Theory of International Politics and 
empirical work associated with it is not yet pervasive.  Therefore, Chapter 2 will 
provide an overview of the essential concepts from STIP that will be utilized 
throughout this discussion: the state as agent, including national identities and 
interests; the macro- and micro-levels of international structure; and the three of 
the potential logics of international anarchy.  As Wendt himself has not provided 
a template for empiricizing STIP, this highly-condensed overview will be 
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presented with the author’s best intent and understanding of Wendt’s ideas.  
Chapter II is not essential for readers familiar with STIP or for understanding the 
rest of this work generally.  It merely serves as a source for terminology used 
throughout the remaining sections and as a compass for readers with further 
interest on the use of constructivism in the study of political science. 
In Chapter III, Northeast Asia will be analyzed at the macro-level from 
1946-1992, to develop a basic understanding of the STIP concepts that pertain to 
Korea’s divided-state relationship.  Again, the primary focus of this chapter is to 
construct the social history of Northeast Asia by assessing the dyadic relations of 
each country involved and then by aggregating the results in to a broader 
framework.  The historical periods will be broken down by significant social 
events, each of which will provide a data point in the evolution of the Northeast 
Asian macro-structure.  The final section in Chapter III will synthesize the results 
about social relations in Northeast Asia from an STIP point of view and will serve 
to clarify some of the constraints on Korea’s division at the international level. 
Whereas Chapter III is an effort to capture an objective “outsider” 
perspective on regional social culture, Chapter IV will attempt to provide an 
“insider” perspective on the Korean micro-structure, as it relates to the regional 
relationships around it.  It will address the national identities and interests of both 
North and South Korea and explore how these identities and interests contribute 
to the regional social culture.  In Chapter V, the discussion will turn to issues of 
concern for U.S. policy-makers and scholars of the region.  Considerations about 
the current U.S. policy status quo will be made in respect to the 1953 Armistice 
and ROK-U.S. Alliance, the new doctrine of Strategic Flexibility, the ongoing Six-
Party talks, and other regional issues.  Following this discussion will be 
suggestions from the preceding STIP study that will not only enhance stability in 
Northeast Asia, but will also promote Korean unification.  Finally, Chapter VI will 
conclude with a commentary on the usefulness of STIP and its potential for 
further analyses in the study of international relations. 
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II. SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (STIP) 
A. THE CONTEXT OF STIP 
A STIP assessment of systemic behavior within the international system 
begins from what Wendt labels “two basic tenets” that have become “increasingly 
accepted” in the realm of constructivist thinking.40  First, ideas are the primary 
source of explanation for the ongoing interactions between individuals, rather 
than material forces such as wealth or power.  This is not to say that material 
concerns are irrelevant, but that they occupy a secondary position behind that of 
ideas.  Second, shared ideas contribute in a fundamental sense to the identities 
and interests of individuals.41  Thus, the meanings of objects and others are 
constantly being defined for an individual while its own identity and interests are 
being reinforced, altered, or rejected throughout interactive processes.  The first 
tenet, that the international system functions as a result of ideas, is important for 
understanding how persistent cultures may develop and impact the components 
of the system.  The holist aspect of the second tenet in STIP is equally critical 
however, by relating individual identities to the ideas they share with others.   
Utilizing individualist-holist and material-ideational dyads, Wendt places 
STIP in the context of four distinct sociologies of international politics.42  These 
sociologies are defined by the four separate quadrants of Figure 1 which 
represent materialist-individualist, materialist-holist, idealist-individualist, and 
idealist-holist combinations.  From a theoretical perspective, materialism-
individualism defines a social system where the actors pursue wealth or power 
due to their own nature (that is the actors themselves are naturally self-regarding 
and desire wealth or power).  Materialism-holism suggests instead that actors are 
driven to pursue wealth and power as a result of structural conditions set by the 
interaction between all actors in the system.  Idealism-individualism indicates the 
                                            
40 Wendt (1999), 1. 
41 Ibid., 1.  Wendt acknowledges that there are many forms of constructivism and that he is 
addressing only one form of it in STIP.  He concedes that proponents of other forms may reject 
his work for “not going far enough” and for being a “thin” version of constructivism. 
42 Ibid., 23. 
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possibility of actors creating their own identities and interests (which could be 
wealth or power, or anything else) without feeling the impacts of interactions 
among other actors.  Finally, idealism-holism presents the opportunity for actors 
to create their own identities and interests, although the social system around 
them has significant effects on this process.   
 
Figure 1.   Four Sociologies of International Relations. (From Wendt, Social 
Theory of International Politics, p. 32) 
 
As previously mentioned, STIP is clearly differentiated from the 
materialist-individualist approaches of Neorealism and Neoliberalism, but it is 
accompanied in the idealist-holist quadrant by other bodies of IR scholarship.  
These bodies, including postmodernism and the English School, will not be 
discussed in detail here.  It suffices to say however, that STIP remains distinct 
from these bodies by endorsing “a scientific approach to social inquiry.”43 
B. THE STATE AS AGENT 
Underlying the international structure that STIP addresses is the building 
block of modern international relations—the state.  Although transnational forces 
and multilateral organizations are pervasive in today’s politics, Wendt, like 
Neorealists and Neoliberals, considers the state to be the essential element of 
analysis.  The “system” described in STIP is built of states, and the interest of 
this discussion is how “structure” intervenes on state behavior.  Therefore, it is 
important to mention the concept of state which will be used henceforth. 
                                            
43 Wendt (1999), 1.  For elaboration on the differences between STIP, the English School, 
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1. The Essential State 
Borrowing from Max Weber and Karl Marx, STIP suggests that “the 
essential state has five properties: (1) an institutional-legal order, (2) an 
organization claiming a monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence, (3) 
an organization with sovereignty, (4) a society, and (5) territory.”44  This definition 
is appropriate; however, recognition of each of these properties by other states 
must be assumed to make the essential state an objective state—a point 
depending on whether state sovereignty is de jure or de facto or if proclaimed 
territorial borders are widely accepted.  An autonomous government possessing 
its own military and a loyal civilian following would not be considered a state 
unless it also possessed a parcel of land recognized by others (i.e. Taiwan, 
Palestine).   
The properties of essential states will not be elaborated on further here, 
but it should be considered that when states interact, they must account for other 
governments, militaries, civilian populations, and demarcated borders.  Also 
included in Wendt’s concept of the essential state is the notion that states are 
intentional, corporate actors that possess self-consciousness and independent 
decision-making structures, suggesting that they can develop internal traits over 
time.45  These internal traits are important because they contribute to particular 
self-understandings prior to interaction with other states.  Once other states are 
interacted with, their subjective perceptions will then contribute to the 
establishment of an identity.  Thus “[i]dentities are constituted by both internal 
and external structures,” or patterns of shared ideas.46 
2. National Identity 
Building on a variety of identity paradigms, STIP consolidates its definition 
of identity around four distinct types: personal or corporate, type, role, and 
collective.  Personal or corporate identities are constituted by internal beliefs or 
subjective ideas about the self, and may produce an element such as “the state” 
                                            
44 Wendt (1999), 202. 
45 Ibid., 218-222. 
46 Ibid., 224. 
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which is cognized solely by its members.  Regardless of whether or not others 
recognize a personal or corporate identity, it can be sustained by its membership 
alone and is therefore not a constitutive identity type.  A type identity is 
developed through association with particular behaviors, experiences, or 
characteristics which have social meaning or consequences.47  States may be 
authoritarian or democratic, insular or land-locked, capitalist or socialist—these 
type identities are objective facts and do not require recognition by others to 
make them true.  However, the reality of these different “types” does have 
meaning to other states in the system.   
While personal or corporate and type identities do not depend necessarily 
on other states, the role identity exists “only in relation to Others” according to 
Wendt.48  Thus roles become a constitutive relationship among states in the 
international system, whereby each state relies on the other to maintain an 
existing role identity.  Being an “enemy” is not a personal or type identity, it 
requires the existence of an opposing state.  Likewise, a state desiring to be a 
regional hegemon will not obtain that role unless other states in the region 
concede a certain degree of superiority and influence to it.  The last identity type 
is that of collective identity.  When various type and role identities between states 
begin to coincide, Wendt suggests that these states may begin to identify with 
each other over time, as several Western nations have.  He states, 
“[i]dentification is a cognitive process in which the Self-Other distinction becomes 
blurred” and actors “define the welfare of the Other as part …of the Self.”49   
3. National Interests 
The four identity types presented by STIP are important factors for a 
constructivist interpretation of state behavior and the aggregate of these 
identities will largely determine the national identity of a state.  Because states 
are intentional actors and value their own existence, they will attempt to 
reproduce the identities that they feel contribute most to their national identity.  
                                            
47 Wendt (1999), 225-226. 
48 Ibid., 227. 
49 Ibid., 229. 
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To sustain these identities though, they must acquire specific interests which 
compel them to act in certain ways.  This is how ideas drive systemic interaction 
among states, rather than material forces.   
STIP elaborates on two sets of interests for states; subjective and 
objective.  “The concept of subjective interests refers to those beliefs that actors 
actually have about how to meet their identity needs” while “[o]bjective interests 
are needs…which must be fulfilled if an identity is to be reproduced.”50  Among 
the objective interests, STIP highlights four specifically which it considers the 
essential interests of a nation.   
First, physical survival is the preservation of the collective state identity 
such that it does not disappear simply after a regime change or a defeat in war.  
Second, autonomy is the independent control of state resources and government 
by the collective state itself.  Puppet regimes or colonial powers would violate this 
notion of autonomy.  Third, an interest in economic well-being connotes that the 
modes of production for a state are not dramatically altered and that its resources 
should provide state incomes, not rents for outsiders.  Finally, the fourth national 
interest is collective self-esteem.  If the self-image of a state is severely damaged 
by others, it may act in a way to redeem itself or bring others down to its level.  
This makes the recognition of sovereignty and expressions of equality by other 
states a vital factor in state interaction.51 
C. TWO LEVELS OF INTERNATIONAL STRUCTURE 
While Neorealists conceptualize the international system as being 
composed of a single, material-driven structure isolated from the reductionist 
properties of states, Alexander Wendt argues that in fact, international structures 
exist on two separate levels.52  The first is at a micro-level based on state 
interaction and the second is at the macro-level of the states system itself.  
 
 
                                            
50 Wendt (1999), 231-232. 
51 Ibid., 235-236. 
52 Ibid., 149. 
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1.  Micro-Level 
The reductionist properties of states (i.e. government type, demographics, 
geography) are important factors in shaping state interests; however STIP, like 
Neorealism, suggests these properties do not in themselves explain the outcome 
of state-to-state interactions.  These outcomes occur instead at a micro-level of 
structure which is defined by the constrained nature of state-to-state relations—a 
level overlooked in Neorealism due to the large explanatory role for material 
concerns.  Without perfect knowledge of what others are thinking, according to 
Wendt, states must consistently “take each other into account” and strategically 
assess their options when pursuing their desires.53  Rarely can states obtain the 
things they want without first contemplating the consequences of their behavior in 
regard to others.   
Wendt concedes this micro-level of structure strongly resembles rational 
choice behavior, like that found in the Prisoner’s Dilemma.54  This leaves a great 
deal of room for existing literature on strategic interaction to contribute to STIP 
analyses of the international system.  However, once the myriad of these 
international micro-level structures are aggregated (all state-to-state 
relationships), the resultant becomes the macro-level of structure, which takes on 
very different characteristics than rational choice behavior would imply by itself.   
2. Macro-Level 
At the macro-level of structure, STIP focuses on the causality of social 
processes and patterns instead of the Darwinian causality central to materialist 
theories.  Drawing from a multitude of micro-level interactions, states may 
develop various degrees of common and collective knowledge with other states 
in the system.  Holding knowledge that is only private may impact domestic 
decision-making and micro-level outcomes, but it does not contribute to a broad 
social culture among states.55  If one state covers its pacific tendencies by 
training a large army for national pride and another state masks its warlike 
                                            
53 Wendt (1999), 148. 
54 Ibid., 148. 
55 Ibid., 158. 
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tendencies while developing a clandestine army for revenge, then neither state 
could be said to be contributing to a “shared” perception of the social reality (in 
fact they would be contributing to a false perception of social reality that other 
states may hold to be true).  Common knowledge among states, therefore, is 
different and does contribute to shared understandings in both subjective and 
intersubjective ways.56  When two separate states believe in the norms of the 
Geneva Convention, and each state also believes that the other believes in the 
same norms, then it can be said that they have common knowledge.   
Collective knowledge among states indicates a shared understanding that 
extends temporally beyond the members that currently perceive something as 
common knowledge.  As Wendt states, “[s]tructures of collective knowledge 
depend on actors believing something that induces them to engage in practices 
that reproduce those structures.”57  As a result of common and collective 
knowledge developing among all of the states in the international system, the 
macro-level may develop its own culture, which is not based on material 
concerns, but on broad patterns of shared ideas. 
Relative to materialist IR approaches, idealism seems to connote certain 
flexibility among states to alter their micro-level behaviors, suggesting a 
propensity for change within the macro-level structure.  While it can be 
convenient to assume this, Wendt suggests just the opposite.  International 
material conditions may change very rapidly via industrialization, modernization, 
or globalization processes.  However, due to the constitutive requirement for 
identities to be defined relative to others, state identities become very difficult to 
change.58  They not only require the evolution of self-images, but the evolution of 
images held by significant others through interaction.  Negative feedback (i.e. 
conflict or competition) anywhere in this process, even from one of many 
significant others, could alter self-image evolution or reinforce past perceptions of 
the other that constituted previous ideas of self in the first place.  Consequently, 
                                            
56 Wendt (1999), 160. 
57 Ibid., 162. 
58 Ibid., 21. 
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since such interactions occur on a near-constant basis in the modern world, a 
degree of ideational path dependence among states is implied.  Therefore, an 
ideational system of states may not change easily at the macro-level; shared 
ideas among states at the micro-level reflect attitudes and actions that are 
products of long, interactive histories. 
D. THREE CULTURES OF ANARCHY 
The previous discussion about shared ideas, constitutive identities, and 
systemic change leads to Wendt’s expanded notion of international anarchy.  
Patterns of state behavior and the acceptance of various norms provide three 
distinct levels of social culture among states according to STIP: Hobbesian, 
Lockean, and Kantian.  Although it is feasible that other social patterns could be 
defined, such as David Kang’s “hierarchical system,” only Wendt’s three primary 
cultures will be analyzed in this discussion.59  Expanding on the definitions of 
these three concepts, Wendt also provides “three degrees of internalization,” 
which quantify the level of acceptance that a state might exhibit toward the norms 
of the various cultures of anarchy.60 
1. Hobbesian Culture 
Having witnessed the European political modus operandi both prior to the 
Peace of Westphalia and after, Thomas Hobbes offered his perception of 
mankind in his classic philosophical work Leviathan: 
So that in the first place, I put forth a general inclination of all 
mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that  
 
 
                                            
59 David C. Kang, “Hierarchy and Stability in Asian International Relations,” in International 
Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific, eds. G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno (New 
York: Columbia University Press), 165-168.  Kang draws from the hierarchic past of East Asia, 
centered on China’s tributary relations with the smaller nations around it, to discuss the potential 
reemergence of such an order as China’s influence rises once again.  He notes that realists have 
not fully explored hierarchic relations, which lie in between egalitarian (or alliance) systems and 
hegemonic systems.  Hierarchy, according to Kang, connotes that a powerful state does not need 
to impose its will on weaker states through forceful means to achieve its overall goals.  
Additionally, weaker states respect the higher status of powerful states while also understanding 
that their sovereignty and territory are not threatened by the powerful state.  Kang suggests 
“hierarchy” is not simply a Confucian model of state relations, but a “Confucian” order is perhaps 
the most appropriate label in respect to the Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian terms used by 
Wendt. 
60 Wendt (1999), 266. 
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ceaseth only in death…[H]e cannot be content with a moderate 
power…because he cannot assure the power and means to live 
well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more.61 
 
This power-hungry perception of mankind provides the basis for Wendt’s notion 
of an international Hobbesian culture, which is characterized by broad patterns of 
“enmity” between rival states.  Under these patterns of enmity, “[e]nemies are 
constituted by representations of the Other as an actor who (1) does not 
recognize the right of the Self to exist as an autonomous being, and therefore (2) 
will not willingly limit its violence toward the Self.”62  
Much of the reasoning for the development of a Hobbesian culture lies in 
the fact that early states had limited encounters with one another and thus had 
little, if any, shared knowledge about intentions.  Communications did not take 
place instantaneously nor did advanced market economies link them through 
daily trade in the same manner as modern times.  Additionally, political, social, 
military, and legal institutions did not provide normative influences or mediate the 
misunderstandings between different states located on distant shores.  Thus, first 
encounters often led to potentially life-threatening events and state security 
became essential.   
In a Hobbesian culture, life or death of the state therefore, relies upon the 
independent abilities of self-defense and war-making.  This fact generates four 
macro-level patterns to state behavior according to Wendt: “endemic and 
unlimited warfare” among states; the “elimination of ‘unfit’ actors” or weak states; 
balancing among states that are too powerful to be eliminated; and difficulty in 
maintaining neutrality.63  Self-help patterns experienced by each state in the 
system eventually become shared understandings about the nature of 
international life.  It is at this point Wendt suggests that, “actors start to think of  
 
 
                                            
61 Hobbes, 64. 
62 Wendt (1999), 260. 
63 Ibid., 265-266. 
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enmity as a property of the system rather than just of individual actors, and so 
feel compelled to represent all Others as enemies simply because they are parts 
of the system.”64    
A Hobbesian culture of international anarchy is largely used by Wendt to 
describe international relations prior to 1648 and the rise of the modern nation-
state.  It is epitomized by historical periods which were dominated by powerful 
dynasties and empires such as the Qin, Romans, or Ottomans.   However, there 
is a pervasive Hobbesian culture (or multiple sub-cultures) evident throughout 
international relations from 1648 until the present.  Many African and Asian 
nations in the 20th century alone fought for independence or to break free from 
their colonial masters while several established states in Asia and Europe 
struggled to prevent their own extermination from regional aggressors.  Even in 
the course of the national divisions of China and Taiwan, West Germany and 
East Germany, North Vietnam and South Vietnam, and North Korea and South 
Korea has there persisted such evidence of localized Hobbesian social cultures 
where enemies are easily identified. 
2. Lockean Culture 
Whereas the Hobbesian culture is defined in terms of enmity between 
states which have limited social interaction and minimal shared knowledge, the 
Lockean culture is defined in terms of “rivalry” between states that have agreed 
to coexist.65  Rivalry provides a fundamentally different logic for the manner in 
which states perceive one another, notably through reciprocal guarantees for 
continued survival.  In Two Treatises of Government, John Locke wrote: 
The state of Nature has a law of Nature to govern it, which obliges 
every one, and…teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that 
being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in 
his life, health, liberty or possessions...66 
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In a Lockean culture, the institution of sovereignty becomes a “right” and an 
“intrinsic property of the state” which is recognized by all other states.67  Under 
these circumstances, overall self-defense and war-making capabilities matter 
less than they do in a Hobbesian culture, since some understanding among 
states exists that absolute survival will not be threatened.  However, a Lockean 
order does not rule out conflict among states, especially if it is justified by one 
state inflicting “harm” on “another.”  Wendt suggests that once the concept of 
sovereignty becomes shared knowledge among states, it becomes a normalized 
property of the system. 
Aspects of a Lockean culture have appeared to increase throughout 
international relations since 1648 when the notion of independent, sovereign 
nation-states was solidified, although it is suggested here that a Lockean culture 
was just beginning at that time.  State “rights” were largely limited to Western 
Europe and perhaps North America, as the competition for global colonization 
was just beginning in earnest.  Nevertheless, Wendt identifies four primary 
tendencies that emerge within a Lockean culture as rivalry becomes a collective 
understanding. 
First, war is limited to an activity of advancing state interests and does not 
result in the elimination or absorption of other states.  Second, limited wars tend 
to preserve the membership of the international society, including the weak 
states which would naturally die off in a Hobbesian culture.  Third, Wendt posits 
that states tend to balance among each other in a Lockean culture, although this 
occurs less out of fear for survival than it does from specific interests or features 
of commonality.  Finally, since sovereignty is largely respected, neutrality is an 
acceptable status for states in a Lockean culture, as long as they can mitigate 
their differences with others in the system.68  American conflicts against North 
Vietnam from 1965-1973 and against Iraq in 1991 are examples of limited  
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warfare where state sovereignty was ultimately respected.  The Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon in 2006 is also an example of limited warfare between states which did 
not jeopardize the absolute existence of an established state government. 
3. Kantian Culture 
The Hobbesian and Lockean cultures concede varying degrees of conflict 
occurring between states in the international system, with the primary difference 
being in the degree of respect for state survival, but both cultures are hindered by 
a limited amount of shared knowledge between members.  The logic of a Kantian 
culture is much different; it is based on a near-complete awareness of intentions 
toward one another and a pact of non-violence which leads to “amity” among 
states.  Immanuel Kant espoused such an international order in his 1795 essay 
on Perpetual Peace which called for a “federation of states,” each possessing a 
republican constitution and having disbanded their standing armies.69  Wendt 
suggests that relations between states in a Kantian system will transcend those 
of temporally limited alliance partners which are found primarily in Lockean or 
Hobbesian cultures.  Instead, states which perceive each other as “friends” will 
desire to settle their internal disputes without resorting to the use of force.  They 
will however, fight as a group if their peaceful order is threatened by an 
outsider.70 
Whether or not a Kantian culture has developed in modern international 
relations is debatable.  By no means have Kantian values developed on a global 
scale yet, but they may have begun evolving after World War II among the 
European Union, North America, Australia, and Japan.  This so-called “Security 
Community” as highlighted by Robert Jervis71 coincides with the first of Wendt’s 
two primary tendencies of a Kantian order—that of pluralistic security.  Pluralistic 
security develops from “shared knowledge of each other’s peaceful intentions 
and behavior” and decreases the necessity for an ultimate arbiter or Leviathan to 
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settle disputes.72  As such, the United States may have trade or immigration 
issues with Canada or Australia, but each nation believes that resolving such 
issues peacefully is in their best interest.  Furthermore, Wendt states that from 
shared knowledge, “the meaning of military power” is changed from its “meaning 
in rivalry.”73  Thus, nuclear weapons in the hand of a friend do not represent the 
same threat as they do in the hands of an outsider. 
The second tendency in a Kantian culture is an extension of the pluralistic 
security community.  Collective security, as Wendt labels it, represents a major 
step away from self-help and individualist concerns.  Once several states have 
identified each other as friends, a threat to any member of the group represents a 
threat to the entire group order.  Protecting the peaceful order of the group is 
critical for each state; therefore they will willingly act in defense of any other 
threatened members.74  In turn, they are confident that other members will act in 
their defense should they be the one that is threatened from outside.  While the 
United States has negotiated a significant number of bilateral and multilateral 
alliances since the end of the Second World War, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization may be the closest example to a collective security arrangement in 
existence.  Although it was developed as an alliance in response to the Soviet 
Union, it comprises free nations which lack the motivation or desire to fight 
amongst themselves for relative power.  Additionally, it continues to grow and 
provide normative regional behaviors even in the absence of the original threat.75 
4. Internalization 
The previous descriptions of the potential logics of anarchy in the 
international system are by no means exhaustive, but it is clear that they each 
connote a certain set of norms that must be widely shared and affect the 
interaction among states.  Without the widespread acceptance of certain norms 
at a given level, then a regional culture will not emerge or exist—the norms will 
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simply be confined to disparate states which hold their own beliefs.  A Hobbesian 
culture represents a true self-help system, whereby states perceive that their 
security is not in the interests of others in the system.  Therefore they must 
expend all efforts toward protection of territory, government, population, 
resources, and the like.  States represent others as enemies as a condition of 
their beliefs about the nature of the system, leading to endemic warfare and the 
death of weak states.  In a Lockean culture, states collectively respect the 
sovereignty of others, and thus will not threaten their absolute survival.  Warfare 
still takes place, but generally occurs only to reconfigure territory, populations, 
governments, or resources.  States represent each other as rivals and accept a 
degree of restraint while competing for relative gains.  A Kantian culture includes 
the aspect of friendship and collective well-being.  It is essentially differentiated 
by the level of knowledge shared by states regarding their pacific intentions.  
Once a Kantian group is established, all members of the group will work to 
protect it. 
In addition to the three social cultures established in STIP, Wendt also 
elaborates on three different degrees of cultural internalization.  These levels of 
internalization signify how thoroughly the norms of each culture are accepted by 
each state in the system.  First degree internalization indicates that a state is 
aware of a cultural norm, but only complies with it due to threats from non-
compliance.  Wendt concedes that any internalization may be difficult in a 
Hobbesian culture, since knowledge is mostly private.76  Conceivably though, a 
state with first degree internalization of Hobbesian norms could develop its 
independent war potential simply because it has to, but not because it wants to.  
If the threat from non-compliance (elimination) diminished, it would be inclined to 
stop producing the means to fight war and pursue other interests.  However, in a 
Lockean culture, a state wishing to alter the sovereignty of another state 
(eliminate it) during the course of a successful border war might refrain from 
going too far out of fear of retaliation from other states.  Wendt labels this 
Lockean-first degree paradigm as the essential ideational construct for Realism 
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to exist within international relations.77  In a Kantian culture, first degree 
internalization may prevent a state from attacking its neighbor at all, due to the 
possibility of unwanted economic sanctions.78  Thus, the cultural outcomes in 
each instance remain the same, but only due to the ramifications of violating the 
norms. 
Whereas first degree internalization requires coercive forces, the second 
degree of internalization represents an acceptance of cultural norms due to self-
interests.79  States operate according to the norms because there is a direct 
benefit for them involved, be it political, economical, or other.  In a Hobbesian 
culture, a small state may produce advanced weapons for limited export to other 
states so that it maintains expertise in certain technologies and boosts its 
domestic economy, even though those exported weapons could potentially 
threaten it.  Second degree internalization in a Lockean culture suggests that a 
medium-sized state might advocate for the respect of national sovereignty to 
ensure an equal status with larger states within international institutions.  
According to Wendt, this Lockean-second degree paradigm represents the 
ideational construct for the field of Neoliberalism in international relations.80  The 
Kantian-second degree paradigm is a potentially strategic level of interaction 
among states, where friendship is portrayed, but perhaps not genuine.  States 
may benefit in trade or security for a given time period by acting like friends with 
others and improving their own relative position.81 
Finally, third degree internalization takes place when a state identifies with 
cultural norms and accepts them as being fully legitimate.  This is represented by 
an exceptional level of socialization among states in a given culture of anarchy.82  
In Hobbesian terms, this level of internalization may bring about an actual 
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interest in enmity, whereby state identities become dependent on maintaining an 
adversary and perpetuating “us” versus “them” behaviors.83  Having accounted 
for Realism and Neoliberalism in the first and second degrees of Lockean culture 
respectively, Wendt labels the Lockean-third degree paradigm as his 
constructivist hypothesis and the “basis for what we today take to be ‘common 
sense’ about international politics (Figure 2).”84  Thus, for Wendt, today’s 
“common sense” is a system of rivals that have completely internalized the 
norms of state sovereignty.  If this were true, one would expect the current 
international system to operate under a nearly predictive set of rules, although 
this is doubtful in reality.  The last ideational construct is the Kantian-third degree 
paradigm, which represents complete identification among states as friends.  
Here, states legitimately believe that their interests are compatible and thus 
extend “cognitive boundaries of the Self…to include the Other.”85 
 
Figure 2.   The Multiple Realization of International Culture (From Wendt, Social 
Theory of International Politics, p. 254.) 
 
The specific application of STIP in this study suggests that Wendt’s 
assumptions about modern international politics may not be completely accurate.  
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While Wendt suggests the world is currently operating according to a Third 
Degree Lockean culture, results here will show that the modern international 
system actually spans each of the three STIP cultures, depending on which 
region is under assessment.86   
Determining the degrees of internalization based on empirical evidence is 
indeed even more challenging than determining which types of social culture 
exist between states.  There are some regions (Western Europe and North 
America) where states have begun to exhibit deep identification with their 
neighbors and peace appears to be the emerging standard.  However, there are 
clearly other regions which exhibit fragile Lockean norms (i.e. Eastern Europe, 
South America) and those which may not yet have escaped the norms of 
Hobbesian culture (parts of the Middle East and Africa).  Due to this difficulty, the 
degrees of internalization for Northeast Asian culture will not be assessed here.  
However, they should remain under consideration. 
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III. THE EVOLVING STRUCTURE OF NORTHEAST ASIA 
With a fundamental understanding of the STIP definitions of state, micro- 
and macro-level structure, and the three cultures of anarchy, it is possible to 
begin assessing the structural logic of Northeast Asia and its potential impacts on 
the two Koreas.  The dyadic relations of the salient regional actors, including the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea), the Republic of 
Korea (ROK or South Korea), the PRC (China), the Republic of China (ROC or 
Taiwan), the Soviet Union (USSR or Russia), Japan, and the United States, will 
each be assessed vis-à-vis each other in four distinct time periods (case studies) 
to determine if any macro-level structural trends exist.   
In Case Study 1, a macro-level baseline for regional culture will be 
established through the aggregation of micro-level relations which emerged in 
Northeast Asia from 1945-1947.  This snapshot of micro-level relations will 
preface a discussion about the regional order which developed more completely 
over the 1948-1954 timeframe (Case Study 2).  In Case Study 3, micro-level 
relations will be examined during the East-West Rapprochement period from 
1971-1979.  Although Case Study 3 nearly encompasses an entire decade, 
micro-level relations from 1979 will serve as the sole data point for the period 
(micro-level relations were relatively consistent across the entire period).  In fact, 
the 1979 snapshot presents a clear picture of the social outcomes from micro-
level events which began in 1971, and arguably before that.  The fourth and final 
case study encompasses the rapid regional reorganization which took place from 
1989-1992.  It will be explored due to the significant micro-level changes which 
occurred, especially regarding the PRC and the Soviet Union.  The year 1992 will 
thus serve as the final data point in this study, providing an opportunity to make 
conclusions about macro-level trends throughout the Cold War. 
It should be noted that the four case studies chosen for this study do not 
represent the only salient periods of evolution in the regional structure of 
Northeast Asia, nor do they intentionally correspond to any conventional 
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periodization of Northeast Asian history.  In fact, the entire history of micro-level 
interactions between states in Northeast Asia should be considered in an STIP 
study since the transmission of culture is an intertemporal phenomenon.  
Additional periods have not been included though (i.e. the Sino-Soviet Split from 
1958-1969 and the Sunshine period in Korea from 2000-present) due to 
document constraints and an attempt to keep the discussion focused on the 
potential of STIP analyses.  In short, only these four periods have been utilized 
because they are sufficient to convey the intended message. 
While the four periods discussed here do not account for all of the micro-
level activity worthy of consideration, they do however, account for some of the 
major events which impacted the region as a whole and which have also been 
researched and written about at length in conventional scholarship.  This 
conventional scholarship, dominated by materialist theories, did not predict many 
of the significant turning points in regional relations which occurred as the Soviet 
Union collapsed.   
By examining international relations phenomena such as regional 
polarization (Case Studies 1 and 2), East-West rapprochement (Case Study 3), 
and regional reorganization (Case Study 4) from a social perspective, a new 
understanding about the past relations in Northeast Asia may be attained.  This 
understanding will be achieved by examining the constitutive effects of structure 
on states and also of states on the regional structure.  As these effects contribute 
to a pattern of social culture, it will be possible to determine the likelihood or 
conditions for certain norms to be transmitted.  In addition to recapturing the 
nature of Northeast Asian international relations throughout the Cold War, the 
study of the aforementioned periods enables an empirically-based discussion 
about Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian cultures at the macro-level of the 
international system to take place.  This discussion will provide a basis for STIP 
applicability in other regions and at larger scales of international relations 
analysis.   
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Due to the complex nature of micro-level interactions among states, some 
degree of subjectivity is necessary to determine whether Hobbesian, Lockean, or 
Kantian relations exist between any two states at a given time in history.  The 
lines of discernment can become blurred even further if the three degrees of 
internalization introduced by Wendt are incorporated into a broad, multi-state 
study (and will therefore be left out here).  Are there definite “yes” and “no” 
questions to ask regarding whether states perceive others in a Hobbesian or 
Lockean manner?  Where is the line between a long-term Lockean alliance and a 
low degree of Kantian internalization?  These are difficult questions, and thus, 
much of what takes place between states must be interpreted by those who write 
about them.  Interpretation is crucial in qualified determinations about 
international culture and micro-level state relations.  Yet nonetheless, 
interpretations will always be open to scrutiny—two judges may interpret the 
same law in different ways.  Therefore, the best that can be done is to maintain 
consistency throughout any single STIP study. 
To maintain consistency throughout this study, criterion for determining 
the nature of micro- and macro-level relations have been established, along with 
justifications to support it. This will allow readers to first assess whether the 
author’s coding of the four case studies is accurate and fair.  Furthermore, it will 
allow for the potential replication of this study or expansion of it to other cases or 
regions.  Propagation of a standardized approach will determine whether 
operationalization of STIP is feasible.  Additionally, critiques of the criterion given 
here will foster discussion about other factors or considerations not made by the 
author, providing new insights for further work based on STIP. 
The first intricacy to consider in STIP is the “recognition” of states among 
each other.  Recognition, after all, is the fundamental breaking point in respect to 
a Hobbesian versus a Lockean culture.  What forms of recognition exist?  How 
do states convey recognition?  Which types of interaction are more important 
than others?  In the modern international system, official diplomatic relations are 
demonstrated when two nations exchange ambassadors and allow embassies to 
operate as sovereign governmental institutions on each other’s territory.  While 
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official diplomatic relations between states does demonstrate an open 
recognition of the “other,” they are not necessarily the only factor in assessing 
the difference between the Hobbesian and Lockean paradigms.  They are 
however, an appropriate starting point. 
The concept of recognition used here must go further than the mere 
presence of embassies to determine the broad cultural patterns of Northeast 
Asia.  Life-threatening warfare and unresolved conflicts also provide indications 
about the degree of recognition between states.  Whether or not these conflicts 
result in the complete loss of sovereignty and territory for one side or a long-term 
stalemate has important consequences for each of the actors involved.  
Additionally, inconclusive conflicts leave questions unanswered about the 
intentions one state has toward another, impacting the neighbors of the state in 
which the conflict took place.  Widely accepted peace treaties therefore, provide 
conclusive evidence of recognition from a military perspective.  Peace treaties 
require the representation of distinct governments which negotiate outcomes and 
direct the conditions to end hostilities between their opposing combat forces.   
Beyond diplomatic and military indicators of state recognition, cooperation 
at various political, economic, and cultural levels also provides evidence of the 
intentions and perceptions between states.  Policies directed at certain states 
which enhance their sovereignty, local economies, defensive capabilities, or 
societal progress can be construed as de facto recognition, although that state 
may not be widely recognized or treated similarly by others. On the other hand, 
policies which enforce the isolation of a state and inhibit its social or economic 
interactions with others contributes to the non-recognition of an entity which is 
deemed illegitimate.   
The second intricacy of STIP that must be addressed is that of alliances.  
Whether states form alliances to balance against a preponderant power or the 
biggest perceived threat is not of concern here, nor is the reasons they might 
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choose to bandwagon instead.87  It is apparent that alliances form under many 
circumstances, but when utilizing STIP it is more important to understand why 
alliances persist, especially if the circumstances which prompted the alliance 
have changed.  The reason is that long-term alliances between nations may give 
the perception that a Kantian relationship has developed, whereby nations are 
identifying with each other in a different way than Lockean or Hobbesian 
relationships would suggest.  It should be reemphasized that the existence of a 
long-term alliance does not necessarily demonstrate a Kantian relationship, since 
according to STIP, alliances may exist for the sake of specific state interests at 
any level of culture.   
J.J. Suh proves this point in his “eclectic” analysis of the U.S.-Korea 
Alliance vis-à-vis collapse of the Soviet Union.  He concludes that both the 
institutional forces of the U.S.-Korea alliance structure along with the 
convergence of American and South Korean identities may have contributed to 
long-term alliance persistence.88  Alliances therefore, must be analyzed in the 
context of other interactions between states.  Once again, additional political, 
economic, military, and cultural exchanges between allied states must be 
interpreted before concluding Kantian relationships exist. 
A. CASE STUDY 1: A BASELINE FOR ANALYSIS, 1945-1947 
To understand the cultural logic of modern international relations in 
Northeast Asia, it is imperative to first discuss the major forces which were at 
work from 1945-1947 and demonstrate how those forces established a broad 
pattern of enmity, rivalry, or amity.  Foremost were the ideas at stake in this 
period, as espoused by the two major winners of World War II—ideas which were 
absolutely antithetical to each other.  On one hand, the United States desired an 
international order based on its own liberal traditions and capitalist market 
economics.  These desires were embodied by the creation of the United Nations 
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in 1945 and further by implementation of the Bretton Woods international 
monetary system in 1946.  On the other hand, the Soviet Union desired a world 
devoid of capitalist-imperialists, which from its perspective, had been the cause 
of both World Wars—a situation which had been foreseen by Lenin decades 
prior.89  This conflict of ideas about how to arrive at a peaceful modus operandi 
and a new world order was evident in the words of prominent figures on both 
sides. 
Amidst squabbling over reparations in Germany, Joseph Stalin criticized 
the West in February 1946, saying “the development of world capitalism in our 
times does not proceed smoothly and evenly, but through crises and catastrophic 
wars.”90  Weeks later, George Kennan of the U.S. State Department noted in his 
“long telegram” that the Soviet Union is a “political force fanatically committed to 
the belief that with the U.S. there can be no modus vivendi…they have learned to 
seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival 
power, never in compacts and compromises with it.”91   
In March 1947, President Harry Truman publicized the international divide 
between “freedom” and “coercion” and correlated international peace with the 
long-term interests of the United States in the famous Truman Doctrine.92  
Kennan followed up in July that year with his “X” article, summoning Americans 
to accept the “responsibilities of moral and political leadership that history plainly 
intended them to bear.”93  In September 1947, Soviet Politburo member Andrei 
Zhdanov highlighted a global division among “two major camps: the imperialist 
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and anti-democratic camp…and the anti-imperialist and democratic camp.”  He 
noted, “[t]he principal driving force of the imperialist camp is the U.S.A.”94  Thus, 
it was apparent by the end of 1947 that the United States and the Soviet Union 
viewed each other in similar light.  Incompatible political and economic ideologies 
among the two superpowers fueled the competition to establish a world order 
which could only be based on one set of principles—communism or capitalism. 
Aside from the developing enmity between the United States and Soviet 
Union based on the contradictions of communism and capitalism, many of the 
other relationships in Northeast Asia were defined by the regional upheaval from 
Japan’s expansion during the first half of the 20th century.  Throughout its 
acquisition and colonization of Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores from 
1895-1945, its colonization of Korea from 1910-1945, and across much of China 
during the Greater East Asia War from 1937-1945, Japan subjected millions of 
people to enormous suffering.95  For decades, it pursued militaristic policies 
which gradually brought more and more of Asia under its absolute control in a 
clearly Hobbesian manner.  According to the Hobbesian definition in STIP, Japan 
demonstrated both aspects of enmity up until 1945 by not recognizing the right 
for others to exist and by not limiting its violence toward others. 
While Japan exhibited Hobbesian characteristics toward its weaker 
neighbors up until September 1945, it eventually faced “prompt and utter 
destruction”96 from American and Soviet forces if it did not unconditionally 
surrender to end the war in the Pacific.97  In Hobbesian fashion, unrestrained 
levels of violence were exhibited by the United States through the use of two 
                                            
94 Andrei Zhdanov, “Report on the International Situation to the Cominform,” September 22, 
1947, http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/04/ documents/cominform.html 
(accessed 9 Sep 06). 
95 James L. McClain, Japan: A Modern History (W.W. Norton & Company: New York, 2002), 
441-522. See Chapters 13 and 14 for summaries on Japan’s “Pursuit of a New Order” in Asia and 
“The Greater East Asia War.” 
96 U.S. Department of State, “Proclamation Calling for the Surrender of Japan (Potsdam 
Declaration),” July 26, 1945, in Foreign Relations of the United States 1945, Vol. 2, Pt. 2, 
(USGPO, 1960), 1476. 
97 Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 
1991), 483. 
42 
atomic bombs (even if representing a show of force against to Soviets) and the 
severe fire-bombing of more than sixty Japanese urban centers.98  These efforts 
were deemed necessary evils to end hostilities and reduce overall Allied 
casualties, yet nonetheless the entire fabric of Japanese society had been 
targeted for destruction.  Accordingly, Major General Curtis LeMay became 
“totally dedicated” to “rain[ing] death and destruction upon ordinary Japanese” 
through the use of incendiaries “in order to break their morale and shatter their 
faith in their leaders.”99   
Also Hobbesian in nature, the notion of Japanese sovereignty was 
violated in dual-fashion during the 1945-1947 period.  In February 1945, Soviet, 
American, and British leaders agreed to strip Japan’s territorial gains from the 
1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War, including the Kuril and southern Sakhalin 
Islands and return them to the Soviet Union.100  Months later, the Potsdam 
Declaration expressed the intent to support Japanese sovereignty although 
limited “to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, and Shikoku…”101  This 
intent was lost however, with the authority granted to the Supreme Commander 
of the Allied Powers (SCAP) by the eleven-nation Allied Far Eastern Commission 
(FEC) in Washington, D.C.   
Through the SCAP, Japan was subjected to the post-surrender directives 
of General Douglas MacArthur’s occupational government, which rapidly 
implemented a new constitution and sweeping legal reforms over all of Japanese 
territory.102  The SCAP reforms were initially focused on the democratization, 
demilitarization, and decentralization of Japan, and thus positive from the 
perspective of Japan’s neighbors and former foes.103  In this analysis however, 
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the positive or negative nature of occupational reforms is not of concern.  What is 
important according to STIP is whether or not sovereignty was lost—and to the 
people of Japan it would have certainly seemed so. 
The loss of existing territories and SCAP’s overall control of the 
government signified the real loss of Japanese sovereignty.  When combined 
with the extensive levels of violence faced by the Japanese populace, a 
Hobbesian state of nature between the allied Powers and Japan is appropriately 
defined.  Further contributing to the enmity toward Japan, the Allied Powers 
deferred the formal peace process.  A peace treaty between some of the Allied 
Powers and Japan would eventually come several years later, as will be 
mentioned later in this discussion. 
In the aftermath of the Japanese surrender, China’s and Korea’s futures 
remained uncertain as they each sought independence amidst the Hobbesian 
culture developing around them.  In China, the two most powerful political and 
military factions had little time to rejoice in their newfound freedom from 
Japanese imperial forces.  Full-scale fighting between Chiang Kai-shek’s 
Kuomintang Party (KMT) and Mao Zedong’s Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
commenced in July 1946 as the country plunged into economic collapse and a 
devastating civil war.104  Although the United States and the Soviet Union had 
not rejected the CCP as a legitimate political party in China’s united future as of 
1947, Chiang Kai-shek had already established himself and his Nationalist 
government as the legitimate authority of China by the end of World War II.  U.S. 
President Harry Truman summarized the status of relations with China on 
December 15, 1945: 
The United States and the other United Nations have recognized 
the present National Government of the Republic of China as the 
only legal government in China… 
The United States and the United Kingdom by the Cairo 
Declaration in 1943 and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by 
adhering to the Potsdam Declaration…and the Sino-Soviet Treaty 
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and Agreements of August 1945, are all committed to the liberation 
of China…These agreements were made with the National 
Government of the Republic of China.105 
 
In what might be considered an anomaly for Northeast Asia in the post-
World War II era, the American and Soviet relations established with the KMT in 
late 1945 connote a Lockean paradigm contra the pervasive Hobbesian relations 
already discussed.  A significant level of recognition was conferred by the two 
superpowers upon what they perceived as a “legitimate” Chinese government.  
This government however, was not yet legitimate within China itself, thus 
contradicting with the STIP notion of an essential state.  By 1947, the KMT had 
clearly not established control over a given population or territory, and was in fact 
losing ground in this endeavor.106  Without being able to accurately portray China 
as a “state” during the 1945-1947 period, it becomes problematic to assign 
Hobbesian or even Lockean characteristics to Chinese relations with the United 
States and the Soviet Union.  Therefore, an exception must be made. 
Where the United States and the Soviet Union recognized a KMT 
government which was not truly representative of all of China, Japan had in fact 
waged war against all of China—cementing an enemy status in the eyes of both 
the KMT and CCP.  For the sake of this analysis in the 1945-1947 period, Sino-
U.S. and Sino-Soviet relations will not be defined along Hobbesian, Lockean, or 
Kantian terms, although closely representing the second of the three options.  A 
determination about these relationships will be made later in this analysis.  The 
distinct nature of Sino-Japanese relations however, should be considered.  The 
people of China, regardless of KMT or CCP rule, perceived Japan as an enemy, 
resulting in an overall Hobbesian characterization between them.  
On the Korean Peninsula, the joint U.S.-Soviet agreement to disarm 
Japanese occupational forces on either side of the 38th parallel led to the 
development of two interim administrations by early 1946—one in the north led 
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by Kim Il-song and supported by the Soviet Union, and one in the south led by 
Syngman Rhee and backed by the United States.  In March of that year, the 
Soviet-American Joint Commission reached an impasse on the implementation 
procedures for a new Korean government, setting the scene for the sustained 
national division which is central to this discussion.107   
In similar circumstances to those of China, there was no clearly defined 
government in Korea in 1947—neither in the eyes of other regional actors, or in 
the eyes of the Korean people themselves.  Additionally, Korea’s post-
colonization fate had been ill-defined since the 1943 Cairo Declaration.108  For 
the sake of this STIP analysis, U.S.-Korean and Soviet-Korean relations will also 
not be defined in Hobbesian, Lockean, or Kantian terms for the 1945-1947 
period.  In respect to Japanese-Korean relations though, almost the entire 
Korean population had suffered due to Japanese colonization and Korean 
sovereignty had been completely demolished.  Therefore, the state of nature 
between the two sides should be considered Hobbesian. 
The preceding assessment of Northeast Asia is not intended to reinterpret 
the history of the post-World War II period or promote the national perspective of 
one side over another.  It is intended to objectively set a benchmark for the 
emerging culture of the time, according to the available STIP variables and 
definitions.  It can be said that pervasive and endemic warfare was characteristic 
of the region generally, subjecting all actors to conflict, while the boundaries of 
national sovereignty were largely disregarded by powerful nations over the 
weaker nations. 
From this complex web of dyadic relations in Northeast Asia, it is possible 
to construct a baseline for the macro-structure during the 1945-1947 period.  
There was clearly a preponderance of Hobbesian relationships and activities 
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among states, enabling the determination of the relative cultural logic in found in 
Figure 3.  As was mentioned, the United States and the Soviet Union established 
a Hobbesian relationship through an emerging conflict in their desired global 
political-economic system.  Japan initially represented an “enemy” to all of the 
actors in the region from its expansive activities in the first half of the decade.  
China and Korea were not formally established or represented states from 1945-
1947, but distinct factions had emerged and began gravitating toward the United 
States or Soviet Union, based on their needs for materiel support and legitimacy. 
In Figure 3, “The Micro-Structures of Northeast Asia, 1947,” each state or 
emerging state has been cross-referenced with each of the others.  For each 
dyad, if an apparently Hobbesian relationship developed from 1945-1947, an “H” 
has been placed in the corresponding box.  While neither China nor Korea had 
been formally divided into the PRC-ROC and DPRK-ROK political entities which 
will be used in the rest of this study, their emerging representations have been 
indicated in Figure 3 as the CCP, KMT, North Korea, and South Korea.  Once 
again, CCP-KMT and North-South Korean relations are considered collectively, 
while they are not considered in this fashion for relations with the United States 






Korea Japan CCP KMT USSR USA 
North 
Korea --       
South 
Korea -- --      
Japan H --        
CCP -- -- --    
KMT -- -- 
H 
-- --   
USSR -- -- H -- -- --   
USA -- -- H -- -- H -- 
Figure 3.   Micro-Structures of Northeast Asia, 1947.   
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Figure 3 is admittedly a basic quantitative measure of the specific STIP 
relationship types which are identifiable from 1945-1947.  Accordingly, only five 
of the nineteen potential dyadic relations are labeled as being Hobbesian, while 
the rest are unable to be adequately defined at this time.  With only a limited 
amount of data based on this period, it is apparent that a Hobbesian culture had 
emerged in the region, although it had not yet encompassed all actors.  
Additionally, with the paucity of legitimate state-to-state relations available for 
assessment, it indicates that the modern international system is still under 
development, even though it began in 1648.   
Significant from Figure 3 however, is the fact that the Hobbesian 
relationships did include the three most-powerful states in the region—the United 
States, the Soviet Union, and Japan—indicative of the Neorealist notion that the 
most powerful states “set the scene” for all others.  From this it is fair to suggest 
that a Hobbesian regional order was emerging in Northeast Asia by the end of 
1947.  In the next time period, this Hobbesian order will develop more fully. 
B. CASE STUDY 2: “US” VERSUS “THEM,” 1948-1954 
The conflict of ideas that emerged between the United States and the 
Soviet Union from 1945-1947 not only drove the foreign relations of the two 
superpowers along Hobbesian norms, but also created a regional environment 
with limited options for the other states.  As both superpowers began identifying 
each other on terms of “good” versus “evil,” these identities began expanding and 
eventually encompassed each of the three devastated nations in Northeast Asia.  
Events in Japan, Korea, and China from 1948-1954 therefore, contributed 
significantly to this expansion of superpower identities, accommodating their 
opposing ideologies in distinct ways.  Events in these places also served to 
expand the regional culture of Northeast Asia beyond the nascent Hobbesian 
logic which emerged in the previous period. 
By the end of 1947, Japan had been largely democratized, demilitarized 
and decentralized by American occupation forces in accordance with the original 
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goals of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC).109  Since the 
Soviet Union possessed little ability to challenge America’s unilateral position in 
Japan, its importance as a Far East economic hub in the United States’ capitalist 
international order was pursued—in what has been labeled a “reverse course” in 
U.S. foreign policy.110  Implementation of National Security Council (NSC) report 
13/2, beginning in October 1948, cemented Japan’s transition from one of a 
defeated enemy to that of a critical partner, remade in America’s image.111  This 
new image was upheld even in the eyes of Soviet leadership, which began to 
perceive Japan as an extension of the United States, and pursued foreign 
policies which reflected this perception.112   
By the end of 1948, Japan’s previously Hobbesian relationship with the 
United States had been altered toward one of recognition and partnership, 
although the initial motives for this change appear to have been American self-
interest in countering the spread of communism (the containment policy).  For 
Japan, it was important to regain its sense of sovereignty so that the new 
government could justify its move toward the U.S. sphere of influence and pursue 
the harsh containment of communism within its own borders.  The U.S.-Japan 
relationship was clearly no longer Hobbesian, and thus evolved along Lockean 
terms.  These terms were punctuated with self-interest early in the Japanese-
U.S. relationship, but progressed as other events transpired in the region. 
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Although the ideological position of Japan had been clearly demarcated 
vis-à-vis the Soviet Union by the end of 1948, nationalist struggles continued in 
both Korea and China.  While Korea’s division in 1945 was initially a collaborative 
effort between the United States and the Soviet Union to remove Japanese 
colonial forces, by 1948, the acrimonious U.S.-USSR relations were being played 
out directly amidst Korea’s independence struggle.  Having helplessly witnessed 
Japan’s rapid transition toward U.S. partnership, the Soviet Union remained 
intransigent over the Korean national elections sponsored by the United Nations 
(UN) in its area of control.113  Nonetheless, the elections continued south of 
Korea’s 38th parallel, and on August 15, 1948, Syngman Rhee was 
democratically elected as the first president of the Republic of Korea.  In the eyes 
of the UN and the United States, Rhee’s government then became the legitimate 
government of all of Korea. 
Not to be outdone, the Soviet Union backed the establishment of the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, north of the 38th parallel, three weeks 
later.  The DPRK was led by interim administrator, long-time communist, and 
guerilla fighter Kim Il-Sung, which also claimed the rights to all of Korea.  With 
the two new regimes installed, each dependent on their superpower patron for 
official recognition and support, the Soviet Union finally withdrew its forces from 
Korea in December 1948.  Six months later, in June 1949, the United States 
followed suit.   
Korea’s status as a nation was still undetermined at that time, but its 
emerging division held the seeds of two conflicts; one for the legitimate control of 
the Korean Peninsula and one fueled by the ideologies of the two 
superpowers.114  Selective recognition by the superpowers of one Korean regime 
over the other nurtured these seeds of conflict, but they also marked a significant 
turning point in the cultural logic of Northeast Asia.  The recognition of two 
distinct Koreas represented a necessary shift toward Lockean norms for both the  
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United States and the Soviet Union.  This turn toward Lockean norms would 
force each superpower to strongly consider their actions among the weaker 
states in the region, out of fear of “losing” those states to the other side.  
Contrary to the situation in Korea where the United States and the Soviet 
Union clearly supported opposing regimes, Stalin and Truman both watched with 
one foot in each camp of the Chinese civil war from 1946-1949.  Each leader was 
reluctant to end up supporting the loser between Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang 
(KMT) and Mao Zedong’s Chinese Communist Party (CCP).115  Since the Yalta 
agreements of 1945, Moscow and Washington had both been committed to 
Chiang’s KMT as the legitimate government of China.  However, as Mao’s 
communist victory became inevitable, Truman passed on last-ditch diplomatic 
efforts with the CCP and prevented Ambassador John Leighton Stuart from 
meeting with CCP representatives in May 1949 (arguably to deflect Republican 
criticism of being soft on communists).116   
Communication between the United States and China was officially 
severed the following month by Mao, who then proclaimed that China would 
“lean” to the side of socialism and the Soviet Union.  On October 1, the PRC was 
officially established and recognized by the Soviet Union.  Although America had 
transformed its Hobbesian relations with Japan and established Lockean 
relations with the ROK, there was a perception that China had been “lost” to the 
grasp of America’s communist enemy. 
Throughout this period, American domestic politics also contributed to the 
evolving identities of the polarized regimes in Korea and China.  In May 1949, 
speaking to the House of Representatives, Richard Nixon dismissed as fallacy 
the contention that Chinese communists were different from any other 
communists.117  In July, Stanley Hornbeck and George Taylor said on national 
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radio that “Communists are communists, no matter where you find them, or what 
nationality they are.”118  In August, Dean Acheson wrote that “the Communist 
regime serves not their [Chinese] interests but those of Soviet Russia”119 and 
President Truman followed suit, stating “the policy on China is the same…we 
have never been favorable to the Communists.”120   
Capturing this new monolithic world-view, NSC 48/2 was written in 
December 1949, demonstrating America’s perception of communism as being 
“evil” and synonymous with the Soviet Union, while anti-communists such as 
Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee were “good” and pro-American.  The 
American position on Asia became to “prevent further encroachment by 
communism…[and] elimination of the preponderant power and influence of the 
USSR in Asia to such a degree that the Soviet Union will not be capable of 
threatening from that area the security of the United States.”121  The policy also 
addressed future American support for “non-communists” in 17 separate 
instances.122 
By the end of February 1950, the regional divide in Northeast Asia was 
nearly complete.  Small-scale conflict had been a regular occurrence between 
Korea’s two sides since its division, and both sought national legitimacy over the 
entire country.  Nearly simultaneous to signing the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 
Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance with Mao Zedong, Joseph Stalin 
gave Kim Il-sung a long-awaited approval for his invasion plans of the south.  
With the support of nearly 40,000 Chinese volunteers (who had also fought 
alongside many Koreans against the Japanese in Manchuria and with the CCP in  
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the Chinese civil war), Kim Il-sung invaded the southern half of Korea on June 
25, 1950, to the shock of the United States which had pulled its troops out only 
one year prior.123   
In immediate response, the United State pressed for a United Nations 
resolution to stop the conflict, and mobilized against the threat of communism in 
Northeast Asia.  Uncertain about the potential for an expanded conflict involving 
the communist PRC and Chiang Kai-shek’s forces on Taiwan, a U.S. fleet was 
dispatched to the Taiwan Strait to keep both sides at bay, establishing an anti-
PRC precedent which would persist for decades.  The Korean War, therefore, 
became the pivotal event in solidifying the divide in Northeast Asia amidst an 
emerging Hobbesian culture.  The outbreak of hostilities however, also 
contributed to the emergence of Lockean norms within the two opposing blocs.   
At the conclusion of fighting on the Korean Peninsula in 1953, little had 
changed among the actors in Northeast Asia.  The Soviet Union and the United 
States remained the primary protagonists, while the weaker states became 
identified with the two respective camps.  They became locked in a long-term 
competition as they tried to rebuild their nations through either capitalist or 
communist means.  The Soviet Union extended official recognition to the PRC 
and DPRK while also solidifying military alliances with them.  The United States 
limited its official recognition to Japan, the ROK, and the ROC, and concluded its 
own bilateral security treaties with them in 1951, 1953, and 1954, respectively.124 
It is clear that the interactions between the Soviet Union and the United 
States from 1948-1954 contributed to the spread of behaviors attributed to a 
predominantly Hobbesian order.  Each identified the other as an “enemy” and 
perceived the allies of the “other” as extensions of the enemy.  Eventually, enmity 
                                            
123 Lee, 41-42. 
124 U.S. Department of State, “Security Treaty Between the United States of America and 
Japan,” September 8, 1951, in U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements 1952, Vol. 3, Pt. 
3 (USGPO, 1955), 3329-3332; “Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States of America 
and the Republic of Korea,” October 1, 1953, in U.S. Treaties and Other International 
Agreements 1954, Vol. 5, Pt. 3 (USGPO, 1956), 2368-2374; and “Mutual Defense Treaty 
Between the United States of America and the Republic of China,” December 2, 1954, in U.S. 
Treaties and Other International Agreements 1955, Vol. 6, Pt. 1 (USGPO, 1956), 433-438. 
53 
became a normalized characteristic of the regional system in Northeast Asia.  
Regarding recognition and sovereignty, both the United States and Soviet Union 
provided few options for the weaker states in the region.  Preservation of the 
domestic orders in the PRC, DPRK, Japan, and ROK relied a great deal on 
political direction, financial aid, technological expertise, and external security 
guarantees from their patrons, or else they would face the enormous pressures 
of subversion and coercion from the other side.  Thus sovereignty was only 
extended in relation to the superpowers, but it was not a pervasive characteristic 
of the order as a whole. 
The rapid build-up of conventional forces, nuclear arsenals, and strategic 
delivery platforms (aircraft) by the United States and the Soviet Union also 
demonstrated a willingness to use unlimited force by both sides, if it was 
necessary for their national survival.  However, alliance-forming and proxy 
conflicts via the weaker states became the preferred means of competition due to 
the ramifications of initiating a nuclear conflict with each other.  This avoidance of 
direct conflict does not negate the tenets of a Hobbesian order; it shows instead 
that Northeast Asia may have represented an ideal Hobbesian order in 1954—a 
bipolar arrangement where each side had maximized its security to levels of near 
parity. 
Among the weaker nations of the region, relations were somewhat 
different, but still Hobbesian in nature.  North Korea and South Korea each held 
claims to all of Korea, violating the internal concepts of national sovereignty, and 
neither side was recognized as being the legitimate government of Korea by the 
opposing bloc of states, which violated external concepts of sovereignty.  
Hostilities between the two Koreas also remained high with the threat of another 
devastating war a distinct possibility.  The same can be said of the PRC-ROC 
divide in 1954.  The CCP claimed to be the official government of all of China, as 
did the KMT.  Neither side enjoyed the recognition of sovereignty or legitimacy 
from the opposing bloc while CCP-KMT hostilities continued to persist.  Japan 
enjoyed the protection of the United States and shared some interests with South  
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Korea and Taiwan in thwarting the spread of communism; however, it was still 
viewed with a great deal of hostility due to the Greater East Asia War and its 
history of colonization in the region. 
The results of the social processes which transpired in Northeast Asia 
from 1948-1954 indicate that the norms of sovereignty and the recognition of 
territorial boundaries were major concerns for most states at that time.  While the 
region was noticeably bipolar, as Neorealists would highlight, this phenomenon 
can be attributed to the social patterns which emerged around the two 
superpowers and their respective ideologies and additionally through antecedent 
conditions pertaining to Japan’s militaristic past.   
The United States and the Soviet Union drove the regional social culture 
amidst their own Hobbesian relationship to establish a world order based on their 
preferred political and economic ideologies.  Figure 4 reveals that by 1954 each 
of the smaller actors in the region had established themselves as essential 
states, and that the type of relationships among them included a mix of 
Hobbesian and Lockean paradigms.  Of the twenty-one dyads, fourteen are 
considered Hobbesian while seven are Lockean, representing one distinct type of 
“Us” versus “Them” social arrangement.  In this early Hobbesian-Lockean split 
however, it is appropriate to consider the idiom, “the enemy of my enemy is my 
friend.” 
  
DPRK ROK Japan PRC ROC USSR USA 
DPRK --             
ROK H --           
Japan H H --         
PRC L H H --       
ROC H L H H --     
USSR L H H L H --   
USA H L L H L H -- 
Figure 4.   Micro-Structures of Northeast Asia, 1954. 
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In the early stages of Lockean recognition between the states of the 
Northeast Asia, it is difficult to classify any specific relationship as possibly 
transcending Lockean norms toward those of a Kantian arrangement.  Although 
two distinct alliance systems developed between the communist and capitalist 
states, these appear to be based on self-interest, which conforms to Neorealist 
assumptions.  Kantian norms, whereby the states would begin to identify with 
each other on a deeper level of shared interest, will be explored later in this 
discussion. 
C. CASE STUDY 3: EAST-WEST RAPPROCHEMENT, 1971-1979 
By the end of 1979, fundamental changes had taken place in the 
Northeast Asian order, especially among the four major powers, as a result of 
both international and domestic factors from the previous decades of Hobbesian 
culture.  The period was preceded by an ideological chasm which developed 
between the USSR and the PRC, sparked by Nikita Khrushchev’s surprise 
denunciation of Stalin in 1956 and his motions toward détente, or coexistence, 
with the West.125  While the Soviet Union was seeking a global compromise with 
the United States, Mao Zedong utilized Khrushchev’s Marxist “revisionism” to 
anchor his own political platform among a CCP that was already divided about 
the future of Chinese socialism.126  As Sino-Soviet relations soured, tensions in 
both Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relations eased beginning in 1971, 
eventually leading the way to American and Japanese recognition of the CCP in 
Beijing.  Additionally, by the end of 1979, a noticeable coalescence of American 
and Japanese interests had occurred, making way for the introduction of new 
cultural norms in the region.   
The ideological struggle between the USSR and PRC was compounded 
by several events which eventually produced a formal Sino-Soviet split.  The first 
of these events were two Taiwan Straits crises—in 1954 and 1958—whereby the 
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Soviet Union did not respond to U.S. intervention over PRC-ROC territorial 
skirmishes.  This symbolic violation of their 1950 treaty was followed by the 
gradual withdrawal of all Soviet aid and assistance to the PRC by 1960127 and 
then by the perceived Soviet-U.S. collusion against PRC nuclear weapons 
development in 1963.128  In 1968, Sino-Soviet tensions were pushed to the brink 
during the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, when the Soviet Union 
demonstrated its willingness to intervene in Eastern Bloc countries which were at 
risk of diverging from the socialist line (the Brezhnev Doctrine).129  Isolated from 
other regional actors and wary of an aggressive Red Army on its border, the PRC 
prepared for “people’s war.”  Finally, in February 1969, as border disputes along 
the Ussuri River turned in to armed clashes between Soviet and Chinese troops, 
full-scale war nearly became a reality between the former allies.130 
As the PRC began to view the Soviet Union along the same terms of 
enmity as the United States did, the United States was facing difficulties of its 
own in Southeast Asia.  With the containment of communism at a tipping point, 
Richard Nixon ascended the American presidency on pledges to withdraw U.S. 
troops from Vietnam, but he needed a diplomatic victory to offset the constrained 
and failing military mission there.  Therefore, in July 1969, he enunciated the 
Nixon Doctrine from the U.S. territory of Guam, sending signals to the countries 
of Asia that the United States no longer intended to directly interfere with Asian 
domestic issues131—a blessing to the PRC after it had proposed the renewal of 
Sino-American ambassadorial talks in late 1968.132 
It is apparent that the overt expansion of Soviet and American identities 
had finally reached its limits by 1969 and the PRC had been far too large to 
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simply be absorbed by one side or the other.  The revolutionary qualities of the 
CCP were initially well-suited for coordination with the Soviet Union, but isolation 
and economic failure pressured the PRC to look toward the American economic 
system—a system which Japan, the ROK, and the ROC were all flourishing in.  
This provided new incentives for the PRC by 1971 to seek rapprochement and 
“lean” to the West. 
  The first major milestone in the rapprochement came from Henry 
Kissinger’s visit to Beijing in July of 1971.  Shortly after this visit, on October 25, 
the PRC was accepted into the United Nations, replacing the ROC as the sole 
China representative (amid U.S. efforts to establish two China seats).  
Unquestionably one of the most significant dates in PRC foreign relations history, 
acceptance in to the world body officially ended PRC political and economic 
isolation and it quickly established diplomatic relations with nearly 40 countries, 
including several Western partners of the United States.133   
In February 1972, the global significance of the PRC was enhanced even 
further when Nixon made the first-ever U.S. presidential visit to that country.  
Text from the resulting Shanghai Communiqué stated: 
There are essential differences between China and the United 
States in their social systems and foreign policies.  However, the 
two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, 
should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states…134 
 
Although the United States and the PRC did not establish official diplomatic 
relations in 1972, each had made significant contributions to the Lockean norms 
of sovereignty and recognition throughout Northeast Asia. 
The second major milestone in the regional transition toward Lockean 
norms came on the heels of the 1972 Nixon visit.  Even though Japan had 
wreaked havoc on China during the Greater East Asia War and had fought 
extensively against the CCP’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), by September of                                             
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1972 each side was ready to establish diplomatic relations, even though a peace 
treaty was not yet prepared.  The PRC stood to benefit enormously from 
Japanese trade and investment while Japan gained another partner in its quest 
to keep the Soviet Union at bay (another nation which it lacked a peace treaty 
with and had fought against repeatedly in the 20th century). 
The verbiage of the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement was similar to the one 
between Beijing and Washington and remains consistent with the STIP concepts 
of Lockean culture: 
The Government of the People’s Republic of China and the 
Government of Japan agree to establish durable relations of peace 
and friendship between the two countries on the basis of the 
principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial 
integrity…equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence.135 
 
The normalization of Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relations was complete 
by the end of the decade, and all parties were still concerned foremost by the 
threats posed by the Soviet Union.  Japan and the PRC finally concluded a 
Treaty of Peace and Friendship in August 1978, at which time the PRC pledged 
to abrogate the 30-year Sino-Soviet treaty which had originally been directed at 
Japan.136   
America’s view of the PRC as a state which stood up to a common 
enemy, combined with the American need for fresh political capital in the wake of 
the Vietnam War eventually led to the de facto recognition of the CCP 
government in Beijing.  On January 1, 1979, the United States and the PRC 
established official diplomatic relations, completing a perceived Sino-U.S.-
Japanese front against the Soviet Union which had been inconceivable only a 
few years prior.137  This recognition of the CCP as the legitimate government of 
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China truly signified the shift away from Hobbesian culture in Northeast Asia 
which began shortly after World War II.  Although the PRC-Soviet-U.S. 
relationship took on the qualities of “tripolarity” or “multipolarity” as Neorealists 
and Neoliberals might suggest, the 1971-1979 East-West rapprochement in fact, 
indicates the initial turn toward widespread Lockean norms in the region.138 
While a major realignment had occurred among the four major powers in 
Northeast Asia, the sovereignty and recognition norms which were emerging did 
not completely diffuse among the two Koreas and on Taiwan.  South Korea and 
Japan established diplomatic relations in 1965 as U.S. aid to South Korea was 
being diverted toward the war effort in Vietnam and represented an appropriate 
step for South Korean president Park Cheung-hee’s economic development plan 
vis-à-vis North Korea.139  However, ROK relations with the other states in the 
region remained essentially as they had been since World War II.  It still lacked 
recognition and diplomatic relations from its immediate neighbors—the Soviet 
Union, the PRC, and North Korea. 
The South Korean relationship with the United States had begun to 
change however, by 1979.  In November 1978, ROK and U.S. forces established 
the Combined Forces Command (CFC); a binational defense arrangement at the 
operational level which was dedicated to the defense of South Korea.140  This 
combined forces arrangement signified just how far ROK-U.S. relations had 
come—relations which encompassed fighting together in the Korean and 
Vietnam Wars, a long-term American presence and mutual defense treaty, and 
the rapid economic development of South Korea through preferential access to 
American markets.   
Through these relations, it is evident that the two nations had begun to 
share many of the same priorities.  However, prior to the establishment of 
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democracy in South Korea, it is difficult to suggest that the United States and 
South Korea had moved beyond their Lockean relationship and truly identified 
with each other.  Whereas South Korea relied on the United States for 
recognition, defensive support, and economic growth, the United States primarily 
needed South Korea only in its bid to prevent the spread of communism (and 
thereby supported the anti-communist yet dictatorial leadership of Park Cheung-
hee). 
As the United States and South Korea grew closer throughout the 1970s, 
talk of DPRK-ROK unification also emerged.  Each side’s unification plans 
strongly indicated preferences to unify on non-compromised terms and a 
reluctance to accept the other as a de facto state.  In 1970, Kim Il-sung reported 
to the Fifth Congress of the Korean Workers Party that the only path to 
unification is to “expel from South Korea the U.S. imperialist 
aggressors…overthrow the present [Park] fascist military dictatorship and win the 
victory of the revolution.”141  In 1973, Park Cheung-hee announced a willingness 
to participate in international organizations with North Korea, but stated “the 
taking of these measures does not signify our recognition of North Korea as a 
state.”142   
During this period, the ROC on Taiwan appeared to have lost the most, 
including its UN seat in 1971.  Its relations with the United States and Japan, 
however, remained intact in all but an official diplomatic sense.  The Taiwan 
Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, passed by the U.S. Congress, committed America 
to “maintain the capacity…to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion 
that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the 
people on Taiwan.”143  This slide in terms of official recognition does not 
correspond with the normal tenets of Lockean culture, but the American 
commitment to Taiwan’s defensive capabilities does confer a level of sustained 
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recognition.  Due to the circumstances of the time, the TRA was the only way for 
the United States to maintain an upper hand against the Soviet Union and 
improve its relationship with China.   
Whereas the regional culture from 1948-1954 evolved in to a strong 
Hobbesian order, much of that order had begun to degrade by the end of the 
1971-1979 timeframe.  The Soviet Union remained the primary threat to the 
United States and Japan, and the nuclear arms race between the opposing sides 
reached astounding proportions.  During the same time, the PRC and the Soviet 
Union digressed from alliance partners to “recognized” enemies, as they no 
longer shared an understanding about global communism.  The border clashes 
of 1969 established a high level of hostility while the threat of a general nuclear 
war also existed between the two communist states. 
  Amidst the initial shift toward a Lockean culture in Northeast Asia, the 
development of a Kantian relationship between the United States and Japan 
must also be addressed during this period.  The United States had maintained a 
bilateral treaty with Japan since 1951, but by 1979 this relationship had 
transcended the simple alignment from which it began.  First, the 1951 treaty was 
expanded in 1960 to include U.S. guarantees to defend against any external 
aggression aimed at Japan.144  Then, in 1978, the Japan-U.S. Security 
Consultative Committee published the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense 
Cooperation, revealing a collective effort toward defense planning beyond the 
alliance basics—including the explicit use of American nuclear weapons if 
necessary.145  Considering this integrated approach to Japan’s security, 
America’s long-term use of Japanese bases, Japan’s support of U.S. operations 
during the Korean and Vietnam Wars, and the extensive levels of political, 
economic, and cultural ties between the two nations, it is appropriate to suggest 
that the two states had begun to identify on a Kantian level by 1979.                                             
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DPRK ROK Japan PRC ROC USSR USA 
DPRK --             
ROK H --           
Japan H L --         
PRC L H L --       
ROC H L L H --     
USSR L H H H H --   
USA H L K L L H -- 
Figure 5.   Micro-Structures of Northeast Asia, 1979. 
  
 Aside from the common knowledge in the region of the Soviet threat, 
common knowledge also developed about the success of market economics and 
the export-led growth among Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan; growth that the 
PRC was also soon to experience after Deng Xiaoping’s ascendance in 1978.  
Between 1971 and 1979, Northeast Asia began transitioning toward a Lockean 
order, based on recognition and rivalry, although some significant Hobbesian 
relationships persisted and one Kantian relationship began to emerge.  Figure 5 
captures the developments of the 1971-1979 period, indicating that by 1979, 
eleven of the twenty-one possible dyads remained Hobbesian, nine were 
considered Lockean, and one was appropriately Kantian.  The changes among 
the dyads from 1954 are dramatic when considering that two Lockean shifts and 
one Kantian shift occurred among three of the four most powerful states in the 
region. 
D. CASE STUDY 4: REGIONAL REORGANIZATION, 1989-1992 
Just as the 1971-1979 rapprochement was a product of events from the 
decades prior, so to was the regional reorganization that took place in Northeast 
Asia from 1989-1992.  The United States and the PRC understood the Soviet 
Union to be their primary threat, and once Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan in 
1979, that threat was only emphasized.  Thus, the decade from 1979-1988 
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allowed for a unique period of Sino-American normalization that was propelled by 
increasing political, military, economic, and cultural contacts even though 
disagreements persisted about the U.S. relationship with Taiwan.146   
The protracted failure of Soviet forces during the invasion of Afghanistan 
coincided with several other strains on the Soviet Union throughout the 1980s.  
Large troop deployments in Mongolia and along the Soviet border with China, in 
addition to continued Soviet efforts to maintain control over Eastern Europe 
stretched the Red Army over an unprecedented amount of territory.  This 
overstretch coincided with an attempt to maintain strategic parity with the United 
States during the presidency of Ronald Reagan, eventually proving to be too 
much for the Soviet economy to sustain.  As the Soviet system began to 
stagnate, reform-minded Mikhail Gorbachev arose to the fore of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1985, espousing a new perspective on 
foreign relations.  This new perspective was punctuated by the termination of the 
Brezhnev Doctrine which had thrust Soviet troops in to Czechoslovakia two 
decades prior.147   
The impacts of Gorbachev’s outlook had immediate effects toward the 
Lockean norms of Northeast Asia and contributed to the gradual reduction of 
Soviet threats perceived by the PRC.  In May 1989, with Eastern Europe in 
political tumult and the two Germany’s approaching reunification, Gorbachev 
traveled to Beijing to reestablish diplomatic relations with the PRC.  It was not 
only the first USSR-PRC meeting in twenty years, but also the first CPSU-CCP 
summit in 30 years.148  Finally, the two communist states agreed to “develop 
their relations on the basis of the universal principles guiding state-to-state 
relations, namely, mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.”149  Just 
as the two foes were coming to terms with each other, however, the Soviet Union 
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was on the verge of imploding and the PRC was on the brink of major political 
upheaval—events which were both of significant interest to the United States. 
While the United States watched optimistically over the gradual dissolution 
of its long-time Soviet nemesis, the brutal PLA response to the June 1989 
political demonstrations in Tiananmen Square generated new American outrage 
toward communism.  Political progress and military cooperation between the 
PRC and United States was abruptly halted and the United States initiated a new 
isolationist policy toward Beijing, rallying much of the Western world to its cause.   
Members of Congress politicized Sino-American relations by failing to approve 
the PRC’s most-favored nation (MFN) status in 1990, hoping to utilize an 
economic “stick” to communicate with the CCP.  Quietly, the George H.W. Bush 
Administration maintained contact with the CCP, but in 1992, presidential 
candidate Bill Clinton criticized President Bush for “coddling dictators.”150   
By the end of 1992, relations between the United States, Russia, and the 
PRC had returned to a pattern of independence from one another, similar to that 
before the 1971 period began.  The primary difference between 1971 and 1992 
however, was that over the course of two decades the Soviet Union, the United 
States, and the PRC had each come to recognize each other on Lockean terms; 
as legitimate states which would not be consumed by an opposing political or 
economic sphere.  Each of the nations represented a major power in the 
Northeast Asian region that would not disappear, and despite a certain level of 
antagonism amongst them, a clear pattern of recognition and rivalry had 
developed. 
As the Soviet Union was collapsing, its need for assistance, along with 
international political and economic pressure on the PRC after the Tiananmen 
Crisis prompted both states to reach out in Northeast Asia at the beginning of the 
1990s.  Throughout the Cold War, North Korea had benefited from significant aid 
and trade competitions between the Soviet Union and the PRC, especially in 
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critical resources like crude oil and grain.151  However, by 1990, North Korea had 
become a drain on both of its struggling benefactors.  Moscow informed 
Pyongyang that it would have to begin repaying its debts and would no longer 
receive crude oil at reduced prices.  Beijing approached the situation more 
pragmatically, hoping to avert instability in North Korea, but also sought to 
improve ties with Seoul, where its trade had ballooned to nearly $6 billion per 
year.152 
In response to South Korea’s outward-looking Nordpolitik policy, the 
Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with South Korea in September 
1990, to the chagrin of its historic ally North Korea.153  Ahn Byung-joon wrote in 
1991 that, “the Soviets have come to appreciate the economic value of the ROK 
more than that of the [security value of the] DPRK.”154  Accordingly, the same 
perception can be considered for the PRC, which followed suit in August 1992 
and also established official diplomatic relations with Seoul.  Even though the 
DPRK and ROK each earned seats at the UN in 1991, South Korea had clearly 
emerged as a widely recognized and central actor in Northeast Asia—a region in 
which geopolitics had previously been divided in to two antagonistic sides.  Its 
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DPRK ROK Japan PRC ROC Russia USA 
DPRK --             
ROK H --           
Japan H L --         
PRC L L L --       
ROC H L L H --     
Russia L L L L H --   
USA H L K L L L -- 
Figure 6.   Micro-Structures of Northeast Asia, 1992. 
 
In Figure 6, the micro-structures of Northeast Asia are summarized, 
capturing the critical changes which took place from 1989-1992.  Whereas only 
nine dyads had been considered Lockean in 1979, by 1992 there were fourteen 
relationships categorized as that type.  Hobbesian relations had diminished from 
eleven to only six of the twenty-one possible, and the U.S.-Japan relationship 
remained the single Kantian dyad under consideration. 
E. MACRO-LEVEL ASSESSMENT OF NORTHEAST ASIA 
While it is impossible to fully explore each of the micro-level structures of 
Northeast Asia in detail in this discussion, an overview of key diplomatic events 
from 1946-1992 provides conclusive evidence regarding the evolution of the 
Northeast Asia macro-structure.  Immediately following World War II, few of the 
states in Northeast Asia were fully sovereign and recognized by other actors in 
the region.  The two most powerful actors set a course to establish a regional 
identity based on their own vision for the post-War world order and labored to 
implement that vision via the weakened states.   
Both the United States and the Soviet Union reached the limits of their 
own overt influence during the 1970s in Vietnam and Afghanistan, respectively.  
Additionally, the PRC became a critical actor in an outwardly Hobbesian 
competition, which forced the West to recognize it beginning in 1971.  
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Throughout the dynamic processes of state interaction largely, initiated by the 
two superpowers, many of the Hobbesian characteristics of Northeast Asia 
eventually yielded to Lockean norms over time.   
Concurrent with the trend of increasing Lockean norms from 1946-1992 is 
the decrease of Hobbesian norms, which peaked in 1954 when bipolarity was at 
its height.  While the gradual decrease in regional enmity has been offset largely 
by norms of recognition and rivalry, not all states have experienced the same 
degree of cultural shift.  South Korea represents one end of the spectrum in this 
“experience” of cultural shift, and is perhaps the one state which was most-
situated in the Lockean paradigm as of 1992.  At the other end of this spectrum is 
North Korea; a state which has not experienced any shift in regional culture since 
it claimed its independence in 1948.  In fact, North Korea is still situated in a 
predominantly Hobbesian culture, fifty-two years after the peak of this culture in 
Northeast Asia. 
Although Northeast Asia has clearly shifted toward a predominantly 
Lockean culture, there is little evidence to suggest that progress has been made 
beyond Lockean cultural norms.  Progress toward a collective identity in 
Northeast Asia is extremely limited—indeed, this analysis suggests that only one 
Kantian relationship may have developed in Northeast Asia by 1992.155  The 
single Kantian dyad in Northeast Asia is represented by the U.S.-Japan axis and 
functions essentially around democratic values and America’s economic and 
security preponderance in the region, of which Japan was incorporated in to from 
the initial periods of its post-World War II occupation. 
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Figure 7.   Macro-Structure of Northeast Asia, 1947-1992. 
 
In Figure 7, the macro-structural trends of Northeast Asian international 
relations culture across time are graphically summarized by the aggregation of 
data from Figures 3-6.  The number of Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian dyads 
identified from each of the 1947, 1954, 1979, and 1992 periods yield trend lines 
which demonstrate four STIP patterns which have already been discussed.   
First, the height of Hobbesian culture is located in 1954 with fourteen 
dyads assessed in terms of enmity.  Second, the initial shift toward Lockean 
culture occurred around 1979, when the number of Lockean and Hobbesian 
dyads were approximately equivalent.  Third, the summary of dyads from 1992 
indicates a clear preponderance of Lockean culture in Northeast Asia, with 
fourteen such relationships based on sovereignty, recognition, and rivalry.  
Finally, a Kantian trend is not apparent in Figure 7, as the only dyad assessed in 
terms of collective identity remained constant after 1979.  The overall balance in 
favor of Lockean norms as opposed to Kantian norms in 1992 suggests that most 
states in Northeast Asia had not yet evolved to a social level conducive to 
legitimate multilateralism. 

























The preceding operationalization of STIP is intended to initiate further 
discussion about the nature of Northeast Asian international relations.  Each of 
the four case studies was selected due to its significance as a defining period in 
modern regional history.  However, as previously mentioned, this discussion is 
not adequate to fully explain the entire social structure.  Many more data points 
are necessary, as well as more rigorous analyses of the periods assessed here.  
Conclusions drawn from the indicated trends are limited in scope, and again, are 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
A. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE TWO KOREAS 
For the entire time since Korea has been officially divided, there has 
existed a competing vision by the governments on both sides of the 38th Parallel 
of how Korean unification should take place.  The merits of South Korea’s 
unification vision are touted by much of the West, especially since South Korea 
has been extremely successful in both its political and economic development.  
Contrary to this, the North Korean view of peninsula-wide socialism is 
undesirable and inconceivable.  From an STIP perspective, this long-term 
competition of visions has occurred at the micro-level between the two states. 
1. Micro-Level Relations   
At the micro-level of relations between the two Koreas, an essentially 
Hobbesian state of nature spanned the Cold War, whereby long-term domestic 
success and military strength were sought to gain legitimacy over all of the 
Korean Peninsula.  Through this process of state-building, each side feared the 
termination of its existence because its opponent did not recognize its right to 
exist.  Life-threatening warfare remained a constant concern for both sides, 
forcing each of the two Koreas to establish and maintain beneficial relationships 
with other states which supported their goals.   
While a deeper understanding about the nature of Korean micro-level 
relations is warranted, it can still be suggested by this discussion that the 
relationship from 1947-1992 was “Hobbesian.” The next step of an STIP analysis 
of these two states would be to determine how internalized the Hobbesian 
relationship is between North and South Korea and how that particular degree of 
internalization cold be altered positively or negatively.  For example, an 
assessment demonstrating third-degree Hobbesian internalization may indicate 
that the two states value their Hobbesian relationship as a means of sustaining 
their own identities.  This seems appropriate at face value.  It would then be 
important to identify policy approaches which not only support their self-identities, 
but which could also diffuse state-to-state rivalry or make it worse.   
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The concept of the Sunshine Policy which led to the historic DPRK-ROK 
summit in 2000 may reveal an even larger, emerging problem within the micro-
level relationship between the two Koreas.  South Korea’s recent attempts to 
reach out and collaborate with North Korea could indicate that it no longer feels 
threatened by Kim Jong-Il’s regime.  Furthermore, it could indicate that the South 
Korean perception of the DPRK-ROK relationship has moved toward Lockean 
norms of recognition.  If, however, the North Korean perception remains 
Hobbesian, which is likely, then South Korea will still represent an ultimate threat 
to its existence.  This divergence in DPRK-ROK perceptions may introduce 
significant complications in further cooperation between the two states. 
2. Macro-Level Relations 
Although much can be said about the significance of micro-level relations 
between divided states such as the two Koreas, this STIP analysis has focused 
primarily on the macro-level of structure around the two Koreas.  Exactly how 
does the preceding analysis of Northeast Asian macro-level structure factor in to 
Korea’s continued division? 
From a macro-level perspective, North and South Korea are two states 
which have “grown up” under entirely different social conditions.  These 
conditions have engrained very different views about the same region which 
surrounds each of them.  Amidst their life or death struggle though, the rest of 
Northeast Asia has evolved toward a Lockean culture, and for South Korea, the 
evolution of widespread Lockean norms has been beneficial.  Seoul has not only 
been incorporated into a pattern of regional recognition, but its perception of 
Northeast Asia as a place of sovereign “equals” has produced enormous shifts in 
South Korean confidence.   
During this period of rising confidence, ROK expectations for cooperation 
within the region have also risen in a manner different than other actors.  
Accordingly, South Korean president Roh Tae Woo reached out across the 
communist-capitalist divide with his Nordpolitik policy.  He was also the first 
leader in Northeast Asia to propose Northeast Asian multilateral security 
arrangements to the UN in 1988.  After being elected president in 1997, Kim 
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Dae-jung followed Roh’s efforts with a six-party Northeast Asian Security 
Dialogue proposal.156  Although the issue was not addressed in-depth here, Kim 
Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy toward North Korea also demonstrates the direction 
that South Korea’s social perspective has evolved.  Seoul clearly feels it has 
developed a unique position at the crossroads of Northeast Asia, capable of 
cooperating with all of its neighbors—even North Korea. 
As South Korea continues to enjoy success and pursue cooperation 
among its neighbors in the Northeast Asian region, North Korea has been facing 
larger problems by the decade.  The DPRK enjoyed the support of Moscow and 
Beijing during the Cold War, but by 1992 this support was largely cut off.  North 
Korea, which has sustained the same pattern of regional relationships since 
1954, has become almost completely isolated from the “social patterns” which 
are now normalized to all of its neighbors.  Lacking the significant support it once 
enjoyed, combined with the Hobbesian world view it has always had, the DPRK 
has found itself reaching the extents of its state survival instincts. 
Staring out across the four-kilometer wide DMZ, the DPRK has been 
backed in to a proverbial corner.  South Korea, Japan, and the United States still 
represent the same hostile threat that they have since Korea’s division, yet 
together they are enormously more powerful now than fifty years ago.  Unable to 
rely on the PRC or Russia for more than mere hand-outs, it should not be a 
surprise that the DPRK has pursued the very weapons that its enemies do not 
want it to have. 
This discussion in no way advocates DPRK nuclear, biological, and 
chemical weapons programs, but under an STIP assessment of state behavior, 
the acquisition of such weapons is an entirely consistent policy for states that 
perceive grave threats to their existence.  Both the United States and Soviet 
Union pursued these same devices for the same reason.  Therefore, the path of 
self-preservation that North Korea has chosen should not be misinterpreted as  
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something else by other actors in the region.  North Korea should be expected to 
maintain its current level of antagonistic and threatening behavior until it is 
recognized as a legitimate actor in Northeast Asia. 
3. Structural Impacts on Korea 
The structural impacts of Northeast Asia on the two Koreas, based upon 
this STIP analysis, have produced two main considerations for assessing the 
region’s future.  First, Lockean norms across much of the region suggest that life-
threatening warfare between the two states would be unacceptable to the other 
actors and that this might help to deter the two sides from engaging in conflict.  
However, this perspective may not be completely accurate since North Korea 
maintains several Hobbesian relationships.  It seems instead that South Korea 
has much less to fear from a North Korean attack, due to its high degree of 
Lockean relations.  There would be much more for the states in Northeast Asia to 
lose if Seoul was subjected to a military attack.   
Second, Lockean culture suggests that the two Koreas would be better 
served by accepting each other as-is and ceasing overt efforts toward unification.  
These efforts explicitly threaten the existence of each state.  However, it is 
evident that South Korea perceives improving prospects for cooperation in the 
region—including cooperation with North Korea—and that North Korea has 
committed itself fully toward preservation as an independent state, at any political 
cost.   
The diverging perceptions that each side has about the culture of 
Northeast Asia will inhibit a significant degree of reconciliation and progress 
toward unification.  Furthermore, as this gap widens or becomes normalized 
(Seoul highly integrated and Pyongyang highly isolated), it will become more 
difficult for the two Koreas to see eye-to-eye.  Thus, Korean perceptions about 
their micro-level relationship may prove to be the deciding factor in how, or if, the 
states unify one day.  If the two states have a diverging view about the nature of 
their own relationship (Hobbesian versus Lockean), it could produce additional 
perception problems to overcome. 
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B. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY IN NORTHEAST ASIA 
Along with South Korea, the United States has represented a primary 
threat to North Korea’ existence since it was created.  Regardless of American 
distaste for the communist regime in the DPRK, the United States has frozen its 
Hobbesian relations with the isolated state even though the region has clearly 
evolved in a Lockean manner.  Making matters worse, the micro-level of 
structure between the two “enemies” is highly complicated by a thin level of 
DPRK-US interaction and communication.  However, from an STIP perspective, 
regional stability could be enhanced by U.S. efforts to normalize relations with 
North Korea, albeit a failed and problematic state.   
Diplomatic recognition is not the simple answer to resolving all of the 
differences between the United States and North Korea, but it can begin to 
increase official dialogue and cultural exchanges that enhance understandings 
about intentions.  Once Washington officially acknowledges sovereignty of the 
regime in Pyongyang and reduces DPRK threat perceptions, American 
expectations placed on North Korea will become more meaningful; for now they 
are simply thrown out as “imperialist” or “aggressive” policies.  Due to the 
strength and regional posture of the United States, it is in a unique position to 
ease the Hobbesian noose around North Korea’s neck and contribute to the 
further expansion of Lockean norms.  Politically, there is nothing for Washington 
to lose by redefining its “preemptive attack” policy and the members of the “Axis 
of Evil”—except a stated enemy.  However, these are the “ideas” which STIP 
suggests are difficult to change. 
The continued presence of U.S. combat forces on the Korean Peninsula 
also continues to shape the DPRK’s perception about American intentions.  
Since there is no longer a need to defend against the communist threat, or to 
defend a weaker South Korea from a stronger North Korea,157 the continued 
presence of U.S. combat forces serves to exacerbate inter-Korean relations.  The 
                                            
157 Hamm Taik-young, “North Korea: Economic Foundations of Military Capability and the 
Inter-Korean Balance,” in North Korea: 2005 and Beyond, eds. Philip W. Yun and Shin Gi-wook 
(Stanford: Shorenstein APARC, 2006), 186-189. 
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forces of communism were clearly defeated by 1992, of which the DPRK 
experienced first-hand, and thus, U.S. forces now provide the raison d’etre for 
much of the DPRK’s excessive defense posture.  This perspective strongly 
correlates with recent comments made by U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld.  Speaking from Fort Greely, Alaska in August 2006, he said “the real 
threat that North Korea poses in the immediate future is more one of proliferation 
than a danger to South Korea.”158 
Recently, Hamm Taik-young wrote that “[t]he role of the United States is 
no longer to maintain a balance; it has a preponderance of power in the inter-
Korean conflict.”159  An American retrogression would not only alter the North 
Korean perception that it must defend itself at all costs—especially through the 
development and proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles—but it 
would also provide Seoul and Beijing more diplomatic leverage in dealing with 
Pyongyang.160  It would be increasingly difficult for Kim Jong-Il’s regime to justify 
its highly militarized posture to its two primary sources of assistance if the 
American presence was reduced (not to mention among its own internal 
constituencies and favorable factions within South Korea). 
In addition to establishing formal diplomatic relations with North Korea and 
reposturing combat forces within Northeast Asia, the United States should also 
lead North Korea, South Korea and the PRC to the conclusion of a formal peace 
treaty to end the Korean War.  The fifty-three year armistice which has been 
nearly forgotten by the United Nations is a diplomatic failure often lost behind the 
DPRK’s provocative ballistic missile or nuclear weapons tests.  As the Cold War 
“winner,” the nation which implemented the modern global economic system, and  
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the nation which recognized both Japan and the PRC after fighting wars against 
them, the United States should feel obligated to terminate old conflicts so that 
new ones can be concentrated on.   
As the pressure for unification by South Korea continues to build, 
especially in the form of the Sunshine Policy and the emerging Kaesong 
Industrial Complex, Washington may find itself in the undesirable role of an 
obstructionist if it does not pursue progress in the realm of diplomatic relations, 
combat troop deployments, and the 1953 armistice.  The recent nuclear threat by 
North Korea has served as a noteworthy distraction in U.S. diplomatic efforts, but 
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles are symptoms of a problem which has 
existed for six decades.  Continued failure by the United States to advance 
beyond a Hobbesian relationship with North Korea could ultimately threaten 
close cooperation with Seoul.  It could also enhance U.S.-Japan polarization vis-
à-vis the Asian mainland; a highly undesirable outcome considering the 
importance of the region. 
A second perspective on the Korean situation is that from a regional 
perspective, Lockean norms have become more common.  These norms should 
gradually increase the likelihood of limited warfare and cross-recognition among 
states.  Although Korean unification is becoming less likely, pressure from the 
overarching regional culture should be impacting the behaviors and decision-
making processes of those states which are not meeting the Lockean norms.  
These considerations are favorable for North Korea, which according to the 
transmission of Lockean cultural norms, should gradually gain confidence about 
its own existence in the eyes of its neighbors.  Whether or not this will be the 
case may fall back on the current pattern of Hobbesian relations, which 
encompass it.  
C. THE UTILITY OF STIP 
The limits of this discussion have prevented a comprehensive 
understanding of all micro-level interactions in Northeast Asia from 1945-1992, 
and the macro-level assessment performed here serves only as a baseline for 
further study.  Utilizing STIP however, has clearly enabled a different view on the 
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international relations of the region than would be provided by Neorealism; one 
based on the distribution of certain ideas, not power.  Concepts of power are by 
no means excluded from having some explanatory power in the evolution of 
regional culture, but these occur primarily at the micro-level and are repeated in 
multiple instances.  In the specific case of Northeast Asia from 1945-1992, power 
in the form of economics and military might became important factors in shaping 
common understandings about each of the actors, but these factors were not 
instrumental themselves.  Instead, they contributed to a much larger pattern of 
social relations that evolved over five decades; a pattern which continues to 
shape Northeast Asia today. 
Through this structural analysis of Northeast Asia, Alexander Wendt’s 
Social Theory of International Politics proved to be as difficult to empiricize as 
some of the concepts are to understand.  To truly grasp STIP, the preceding 
case study would have to be analyzed at both macro- and micro-levels, including 
the application of cultural internalization, across consistent and consecutive time 
periods.  Micro-level relationships need to be assessed in relation to changes or 
continuity at the macro-level, and in relation to other micro-level relations.  
Cultural internalization would need to be thoroughly defined to reduce the 
ambiguity raised by certain Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian categorizations.  
Finally, the concepts of state identity formation, according to STIP definitions and 
multiple micro-level interactions would have to be addressed.   
As a starting point for empirical testing, this thesis aims to generate 
deeper discussion about the potential use of STIP in contemporary assessments 
of international relations.  Northeast Asia has proven to be a complicated region 
which is commonly understood through materialist Cold War literature.  To 
improve modern understandings about Northeast Asia and other regions of the 
world, the study of systemic social culture and its effect on state behavior must 
be expanded.  Greater work is needed in both the development of adequate 
criterion for classifying micro- and macro-level relations and also with how the 
varying degrees of cultural internalization are exhibited.  Assessments of other 
complicated regions, including the Middle East and Africa are necessary, as are 
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the exploration of different cultural concepts, such as Confucian and Islamic 
social cultures.  Unquestionably, there are elements of these cultures present in 
various geographic areas.  The efforts to appropriately apply STIP to 
International Relations studies are extensive; however, based on the potential 
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